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Exploring the Impact of the Marriage Amendments: Can Public Employers Offer Domestic
Partner Benefits to Their Gay and Lesbian Employees?
Tiffany C. Graham1
Introduction
Over the course of the past decade, the question of same-sex marriage has been one of the
most contentious issues affecting this country. Since 1998, forty-four states have prohibited the
creation or recognition of same-sex marriage,2 and twenty-seven states have solidified their
positions on this issue through the passage of state constitutional amendments.3 Eighteen of
these amendments extend their prohibitions even farther by refusing to create or recognize civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or any other alternative to traditional marriage that is patterned
after marriage.4 It is this last group of amendments that currently poses a potentially intractable
problem: is the language employed by these amendments so broad that they arguably prevent
public entities5 from providing domestic partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees?
Public institutions around the country – especially institutions of higher learning – are struggling
with this issue. If current law prevents them from offering domestic partner benefits, how can
they compete effectively for talented gay and lesbian employees, and retain the ones they
currently have?
This concern is neither trivial nor hypothetical. The University of Wisconsin, for
instance, recently lost a top nanotechnology researcher to the University of Pennsylvania because
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See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Marriage in the Fifty States, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/Marriage50/index.cfm (last visited on March 11, 2008).
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See id.
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See Appendix 1. The state amendments referenced here are the following: Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774),
Arkansas (Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4), Idaho (Idaho Const. art. III, § XXVIII), Kansas
(Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16), Kentucky (Ky. Const. pt. 2, § 233A), Louisiana (La. Const. art. XII, §15), Michigan
(Mich. Const. art. I, § 25), Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29), North Dakota (N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (Ohio
Const. art. XV, § 11), Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, § 35), South Carolina (S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15), South
Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9), Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32), Utah (Utah Const. art. I, § 29), Virginia (Va.
Const. art. I, § 15), and Wisconsin (Wis. art. XIII, § 13). This group of amendments is notable for two reasons: (1)
they represent an effort by voters to restrain “activist” judges who might force their states to legalize gay and lesbian
relationships, popular discomfort with the idea notwithstanding, and (2) they are typified by the use of far-reaching,
ambiguous language that has swept partner benefits plans within their arguable reach.
5

The prohibitions in the amendments should apply only to public entities because the language used implies that
proof of state action is necessary to establish a violation of the amendment. See Appendices 1-3 (noting that many
of the amendments prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage or similar regimes); see also discussion infra Part
III A. (arguing that recognition is a term of art that requires state action for its operation).

Penn, unlike Wisconsin, offers a domestic partner benefits plan.6 Partially for identical reasons,
another Wisconsin employee – this time, a highly-placed administrator – took a deanship
position at Arizona State University.7 The Student Housing Director at the University of Kansas
recently expressed her support for a proposed partner benefits plan so that she can cover her
soon-to-be-retired life partner.8 Even though she and her partner wish to remain in Kansas, the
director has noted that moving to a school in another state would net her the benefits that she and
her partner need.9 This controversy over domestic partner benefits has also become an issue at
the University of Texas at Austin, where a lecturer in Arabic staged a hunger strike to publicize
the university’s failure to offer partner benefits to its gay and lesbian employees.10 The
university, however, maintained that its hands were tied: state law prevented it from offering
family or spousal benefits to any person not recognized as a spouse or family member under
Texas law.11
In addition, public employers in Ohio, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana, and Michigan – each
of whose amendments falls into the problematic category – are currently addressing explicit
challenges to their ability to offer partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees. A state
legislator in Ohio, for instance, has filed suit against Miami University, alleging that its domestic
partner benefits program violates the marriage amendment.12 Similarly, the Kentucky Senate has
recently passed a bill which prohibits government agencies from offering partner benefits to their
gay and lesbian employees.13 In Idaho, the Attorney General has issued an opinion which finds
that the City of Moscow’s decision to offer benefits to the domestic partners of its employees
6

See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 27 (2006-2007) (hereinafter “The State of the Workplace”) (discussing some of the
consequences of not offering domestic partner benefits).
7

See Megan Twohey, UW Dean Cites Benefits in Leaving, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, June 14, 2005,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=333480 (discussing the political controversy surrounding
domestic partner benefits in Michigan) (last visited on March 12, 2008). The administrator stated that Wisconsin
had lost employee candidates when they realized that the university did not offer partner benefits. See id.
Moreover, she noted that several of her colleagues had begun looking for new jobs because of the lack of partner
benefits. See id.
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See Jonathan Kealing, Benefits Urged for Domestic Partners, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, March 5, 2008,
available at http://www.mobile.ljworld.com/news/2008/mar/05/benefits_urged_domestic_partners/ (discussing the
conclusion reached by the University of Kansas’ University Senate Executive Committee that the school should
offer domestic partner benefits) (last visited on March 11, 2008).
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See id.
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See Hunger Strike for Partner Benefits, Inside Higher Ed, January 21, 2008, available at
http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2008/01/21/hunger (last visited on February 26, 2008).
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See id.
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See Brinkman v. Miami Univ., 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007), at *1. The trial court dismissed
the suit in on standing grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See id.
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See Stephanie Steitzer, Bill Bans Same-Sex Partner Benefits, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, available at,
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080131/NEWS0101/801310406 (Jan. 31, 2008 ).
The University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville began offering partner benefits in 2006. See id. They
have argued that passage of this bill will hamper their ability to recruit the most talented individuals. See id.
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likely “constitute[d] recognition of a domestic legal union other than marriage” in violation of
the marriage amendment.14 Finally, parties in Louisiana are in the midst of litigation concerning
the validity of New Orleans’ domestic partner benefit plan.15 Other potential challenges are
certainly looming on the horizon.16
This impending wave of employee-benefits litigation will force courts to address a
variety of interpretive challenges as they consider the operative scope of the amendments.
Among the states that have marriage amendments, they can be broken down into two broad
categories: (1) Single-Subject Amendments (“SSAs”) and (2) Multi-Subject Amendments
(“MSAs”). SSAs merely prohibit same-sex marriage; MSAs prohibit both same-sex marriage
and the establishment of state-recognized relationship regimes that are parallel or akin to
marriage. Of course, the language used by the MSAs varies wildly from state to state; therefore,
the effect of each amendment on a particular dispute may differ somewhat from state to state.17
These distinctions notwithstanding, two textual patterns have emerged: (1) the first pattern
prohibits the states from granting the rights, benefits, privileges, or incidents of marriage to
unmarried couples generally or same-sex couples in particular; and (2) the second pattern
establishes a more generalized set of prohibitions. In this Article, I describe the former group of
amendments as “Incidents Model” MSAs and the latter group of amendments as “Comparative
Model” MSAs. This paper will focus on the impact of the Comparative Model MSAs.
The scope of the prohibitions in the Comparative Model MSAs will ultimately turn on the
degree of replication between marriage and any parallel regime that is forbidden by the
amendment in question. As such, the Comparative Model MSAs lend themselves to further
subdivision into three categories: (1) those that prohibit both same-sex marriage and parallel
arrangements that are identical to marriage; (2) those that prohibit same-sex marriage and
parallel arrangements that are identical or substantially similar to marriage; and (3) those that
prohibit same-sex marriage and parallel arrangements that are similar to marriage. At present,
domestic partner benefits plans which are offered by public employers face huge potential threats
in Comparative Model MSAs states because their effectiveness depends on state recognition of
relationships that arguably mimic marriage to a prohibited degree.
How should courts address these challenges under their respective marriage amendments
when they inevitably arise? Numerous scholars would argue that the amendments are flatly
unconstitutional and should not apply to anything at all.18 Other scholars eschew this approach
14

See City of Moscow, Health Insurance Policy, Idaho Op. Att’y Gen. 9 (2008).
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See Ralph v. City of New Orleans, No. 2003-09871, Civ. D. Ct. Parish of Orleans (Jan. 15, 2008).
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The local governments of Dallas, Texas and Travis County, Texas (which includes Austin) offer medical benefits,
dental benefits, and COBRA to government employees. See Sarah Coppola, City Weighs Cost of Higher Health
Plan, Austin-American Statesman, May 6, 2006, at D1. In addition, Ohio State University offers health care
benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 52 (listing
Ohio State University as one of the schools offering domestic partner benefits to its employees). All of these
programs may find themselves subject to attack under the terms of Ohio’s and Texas’ respective amendments.
17
See, e.g., Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments & Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy,
and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQU. 59, 60-62 (2007) (hereinafter “Plain Meaning”) (describing the
various textual differences that exist among the amendments).
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See id. at 59 (arguing that the marriage amendments should be narrowly-construed in order to avoid
constitutionally infirm applications); see also L. Lynn Hogue, Romer Revisited, or “The Devil in the Details”: Is
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by considering whether various material goods – including domestic partner benefits – are
threatened by the enforcement of these amendments.19 In this Article, I will also consider the
impact of enforcement, but I will do so by proposing an interpretive methodology that courts
may use when trying to evaluate the validity of domestic partner benefits plans.20 I ultimately
conclude that such plans do not violate the provisions of the first two sub-categories of
Comparative Model MSAs, but may, in fact, violate the provisions of the third sub-category. In
order to evaluate whether the plans do violate the provisions of the third sub-category of
Comparative Model MSAs, I recommend that courts look at the history underlying the passage
of the amendments and determine whether the voters intended to prohibit public employers from
offering such plans. If the answer to this question is yes, then the plans should be invalidated; if
the answer to this question is no, then the plans should be upheld.
Part One offers an overview of domestic partner benefits plans and discusses the manner
in which they are currently being threatened by the interpretation of the Comparative Model
MSAs. This threat, however, begs an important question: given the increased acceptance of
gays and lesbians in many other areas of life, why, exactly, are these benefits regimes under
threat? A seeming paradox exists between the growing levels of tolerance for gays and lesbians
in society and the decision by voters to support these amendments whose potential wide-ranging
effect was communicated to them prior to the election. What, exactly, did the voters intend to
accomplish when they supported the passage of the marriage amendments? Part One will
conclude with an inquiry into this question.
Part Two will then take a close look at one of these controversies, National Pride at Work
v. Michigan, which is currently pending before the Michigan Supreme Court. As a matter of first
impression, this case represents the first time that a state court of last resort has considered the
scope of a public entity’s authority to offer domestic partner benefits in light of the state’s
Georgia’s Marriage Amendment Constitutionally Defective?, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 255 (2005) (arguing that
Georgia’s marriage amendment violates the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans); Lisa M.
Polk, Montana’s Marriage Amendment: Unconstitutionally Denying a Fundamental Right, 66 MONT. L. REV. 405
(2005) (arguing that Montana’s marriage amendment is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); Wilson Huhn, Ohio Issue 1 is Unconstitutional, 28 N.C. CENT. L.
J. 1 (2005) (arguing that the Ohio marriage amendment is unconstitutional); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage
Referenda and the Constitution: On Hunter, Romer, and Electoral Process Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2001)
(arguing that the same-sex marriage referenda violate electoral process guarantees); accord Mark Strasser, From
Colorado to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati: On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality of Referenda,
36 HOUSTON L. REV. 1193 (1999); Sarah K. Snow, What Missouri ‘Shows Me’ About Sexual Orientation
Legislation, 37 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 807 (2006) (arguing that Missouri’s marriage amendment is subject to challenge
under Romer because animus motivated its passage); but see Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge, & William
C. Duncan, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213
(1999) (arguing that the Alaska marriage amendment is constitutional).
19

See Strasser, supra n. 17, Plain Meaning, 25 LAW & INEQU. at 91-92 (arguing that the language of the Michigan
marriage amendment should not prevent employers from offering domestic partner benefits); see also L. Lynn
Hogue, State Choice-of-Law Doctrine & Non-Marital Same-Sex Partner Benefits: How Will States Enforce the
Public Policy Exception?, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 549 (2005) (arguing that none of the marriage amendments should
preclude domestic partner benefits, and if they do, they might be vulnerable Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.
Texas); William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 233,
240-246 (2005) (suggesting that a careful interpretation of the marriage amendments will result in the invalidation of
public employees’ domestic partner benefits plans, and the validation of others).
20

As noted, my focus is on the Comparative Model MSAs, but courts whose amendments do not fall into that
category might still use the analysis that I propose.
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marriage amendment.21 Analysis of both the factual backdrop of National Pride at Work and the
case itself illustrates the interpretive difficulties that may arise when public employers in states
with Comparative Model MSAs condition the receipt of partner benefits on the existence of the
gay or lesbian relationship. In this section, I will conclude that the Court of Appeals offered an
interpretive methodology that was more appealing than the methodology offered by the trial
court, but that the analysis grew less persuasive when the court failed to consider the role of
voter intent when interpreting the meaning of the similarity provision in the Michigan
amendment.
After examining some of the methodological errors that a reviewing court might make,
Part Three identifies the primary concepts in the Comparative Model MSAs – “recognition,”
“status,” and “similarity to marriage” – and offers an analysis of these terms that will help courts
understand them in the event that they are called upon to evaluate them. In the course of the
analysis, I find that a public employer’s decision to premise the dispensation of partner benefits
on the existence of the employee’s relationship violates the prohibition against recognizing a
status for unmarried individuals, but the crux of the analysis is the similarity provision: if the
status recognized by the state does not fall within the scope of the similarity provision laid out by
the amendment, then the domestic partner benefits plan should be upheld.

I.

Background
A.

Overview of Partner Benefits and the Marriage Amendments: An
Important Victory That is Currently Under Threat

The dilemma that now faces the gay and lesbian community was probably inevitable.
Over the course of the past twenty years, gays and lesbians have won gradually higher levels of
acceptance from the public, and consequently, have achieved significant victories in many
arenas. Those arenas include, among others, protection against discrimination in employment
and in public accommodations, the invalidation of anti-sodomy statutes, the establishment of
adoption rights, and a remarkable increase in the number of openly-gay public officials. 22 Their
21

Even though the Michigan Supreme Court will be the first high court to resolve this issue, it will not be the first
court to do so. In re Utah State Retirement Board considered whether Salt Lake City’s decision to provide health
care benefits to the domestic partners of city employees violated Utah’s marriage amendment. See In re Utah State
Retirement Board, No. 050916879 (Utah D. Ct. 2006), available at http: www.acluutah.org/normanruling.pdf. The
trial court found that the “Adult Designee Benefit” established by the city did not give “’the same or substantially
equivalent legal effect’ as marriage to any other ‘domestic union.’” Id. at 4.
22

The United States Supreme Court, for instance, handed gays and lesbians two of their most significant legal
victories to date in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas. In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s
Amendment 2, which prohibited state officials from extending anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians as

5

losses, however, have been most acute in the arena of marriage rights, and these failures have
fueled the current debate over domestic partner benefits.
The quest for equal marriage rights is a short and familiar story. In 1990, same-sex
marriage was not legally recognized or permitted anywhere in this country. Since then, of
course, a handful of states have legalized same-sex relationships to varying degrees: several
have established relationship regimes that carry with them limited sets of rights,23 while others
have established relationship regimes that parallel marriage as closely as possible.24
Massachusetts, of course, is the lone state that has allowed gays and lesbians to marry.25 These
victories, however, do not represent the generally prevailing political norm. From 1998-2003,
six states passed amendments banning same-sex marriage. Since then, however, twenty-one
states have done so.26 The move to ban same-sex marriage reached its high point with the
a class. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-626 (1996). The Supreme Court in Lawrence invalidated antisodomy statutes across the nation, prompting several noted academics to compare the impact of the case to Brown v.
Board of Education. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown &
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 487-489 (2005) (arguing that Lawrence may take the same path
as Brown – initially vilified in certain quarters, but ultimately viewed as a model of progress); Pamela S. Karlan,
Introduction: Same-Sex Marriage as Moving Story, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 1 (2005) (suggesting that Lawrence
might be the equivalent of Brown for the gay rights movement if it eventually leads the Supreme Court to strike
down laws against same-sex marriage); accord Constitutional Law Symposium: The Role of Courts in Social
Change, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 903, 904 (2006) (identifying Professor Jane Schacter as a panel participant who noted
the sense among members of the gay rights movement that “[Lawrence] is our Brown.”). In addition, at least eleven
states and the District of Columbia either implicitly or explicitly permit gay and lesbian couples to adopt children.
See Gary J. Gates, et al., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(March 2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/WilliamsInstitute/publications/FinalAdoptionReport.pdf (last
visited March 11, 2008). On the political front, twenty states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. See infra n. 56. Twelve of those states and the District of Columbia also prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender identity. See infra n. 57. In addition, there are approximately four hundred
openly gay elected officials in the United States. See Rachel La Corte, Only N.H. Has More Gay Lawmakers Than
Washington, HERALDNET, Jan. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.heraldnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080123/NEWS03/559000605&template=printart, (last
visited March 11, 2008). Finally, public and private employers around the country have been offering their
employees domestic partner benefits in ever-increasing numbers. See infra nn. ___. These victories, and others,
attest to the fact that gay and lesbian issues are reshaping various aspects of the American legal and political
landscape.
23

Hawaii, Maine, Washington, and the District of Columbia offer limited protection to committed gay and lesbian
relationships. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (2007); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.5, § 4572 (2007); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.60.060 (2007); D.C. STAT. § 32-701 et seq. (2008).

24

Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New Hampshire have passed civil union statutes which guarantee gay and
lesbian couples all of the same rights that married heterosexual couples receive under state law. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1204 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. 46b-38aa (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1-31 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457-A:1 (2007). Similarly, California, and Oregon have created equally generous regimes, but rather than
using the “civil unions” terminology, they instead use the term “domestic partnership.” See CAL. FAMILY CODE §
297 (2008); see also OREGON FAMILY FAIRNESS ACT, H. 2007, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
25

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Not only did Massachusetts legalize
same-sex marriage in Goodridge, the state legislature defeated an effort to overturn the decision by means of a
constitutional amendment. See Frank Phillips, Legislators Vote to Defeat Same-Sex Marriage Ban (June 14, 2007),
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/2007/06/legislators_vot_1.html.

26

See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Marriage in the Fifty States, supra n. 2.
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passage of eleven amendments during the 2004 presidential election.27 The frenzy surrounding
the passage of the amendments has died down substantially in the United States, but the reality
of their presence is making itself known.
At the same time that voters have been placing limits on the ability of gays and lesbians
to formalize their relationships, increasing numbers are embracing their sexuality and publicly
making the lifestyle choices that heterosexual couples make: they are entering into committed
relationships with their partners, buying homes in cities and suburbs, adopting and raising
children, volunteering in their communities, and building careers. Public and private employers
have observed these shifts in the American social landscape and responded to these changes in a
variety of ways. One of the most significant responses has been through the provision of
domestic partner benefits for their gay and lesbian employees.
American employers have been providing partner benefits since 1982, when the Village
Voice newspaper began offering them to their unmarried employees.28 Just over twenty-five
years later, approximately 9300 employers in the United States currently offer domestic partner
benefits, the most common of which are health care benefits.29 Such employers include more
than half of Fortune 500 companies, almost eighty percent of Fortune 100 companies, eightyeight of the hundred top-grossing law firms, thirteen state governments and the District of
Columbia government, 145 city and county governments, and more than 300 colleges and
universities (of which approximately 141 are public schools).30 Fifty-eight percent of employers
offer domestic partner benefits to both same-sex and opposite couples.31 The remaining
companies limit their programs to same-sex couples because they do not have the option of
marriage.32
Employers have chosen to offer these benefits packages for a variety of reasons. First of
all, many employers choose to offer partner benefits as a mechanism for recruiting and retaining
talented workers and to gain a competitive advantage over employers who do not offer these
benefits.33 Other employers are compelled to offer partner benefits as a result of the labor

27

See CNN.com: Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/

28
See Alene Russell, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Equity, Fairness, and Competitive Advantage, A HIGHER
EDUCATION BRIEF (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, Oct. 2007) (hereinafter “Equity,
Fairness, and Competitive Advantage”).
29

See id. (discussing the number of employers in the nation who offer partner benefits).; see also Mary Beth
Braitman, Terry A.M. Mumford, and Katrina M. Clingerman, Implementing a Domestic Partner Benefits Policy,
HUMAN RESOURCES 192 (Winter 2008), available at http://www.icemiller.com/publications/19-ANSWRWinter2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (detailing the kinds of benefits that employers typically cover).
30
See id. at 4-5 (discussing the number of employers providing partner benefits across multiple sectors of the
economy); see also THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 21 (same).
31

See Russel, Equity, Fairness, and Competitive Advantage, supra n. 28, at 4.

32
See Samir Luther, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS: EMPLOYER TRENDS AND BENEFITS EQUIVALENCY FOR THE
GLBT FAMILY 9 (March 2006), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/Guide-to-Employer-Trends-andBenefits-Equivalency-for-the-GLBT-Family.pdf.
33

See Braitman, et al., Implementing a Domestic Partner Benefits Policy, supra n. 29, at 189.
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negotiations process.34 Still others do so “because they believe it is the right thing to do.”35
Employers who fall into this last category are often committed to supporting diversity in the
workplace and providing equal pay for equal work: in the absence of benefits, gay and lesbian
employees receive significantly less compensation than their married colleagues who do receive
such benefits – roughly one-fifth of overall compensation is derived from employer-provided
benefits.36
The marriage amendments, of course, now threaten much of the progress signified by the
provision of partner benefits. Although private sector employers are not affected,37 public
employers might find that one (potentially) unintended effect of the amendments is the loss of
their authority to offer domestic partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees.38 One-third
of the amendments restrict only the creation or recognition of same-sex marriage,39 but most of
the remaining two-thirds prohibit the creation or recognition of a legal status for unmarried
people that would be similar to marriage.40 It is this latter group of amendments that poses the
real challenge. If, for instance, a public employer subject to one of these amendments offered
partner benefits to a lesbian employee who met eligibility criteria that turned on the existence of
her relationship, did the employer recognize a legal status for this union in violation of the

34

See id.

35

Id.

36

See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 13. Gay and lesbian employees, however, have not received
these benefits as a matter of course. In many instances, advocates have had to fight for their provision. The
American Civil Liberties Union, for example, has filed a lawsuit against the University of Wisconsin because of its
refusal to allow gay and lesbian employees to include domestic partners on their health insurance plans. See
Helgeland v. Wisconsin, 724 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (arguing that a law which prevents state
employers from offering domestic partner health insurance violates the state’s constitutional guarantee of equal
protection). Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, Wisconsin approved a marriage amendment which states in
part, “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid
or recognized in this state.” See Appendix 1; cf. Snetsinger v. Montana University Sys., 104 P. 3d 445, 452 (Mont.
2004) (holding that a university policy which provided health insurance coverage for the opposite-sex partners of its
unmarried employees while denying such coverage to the same-sex partners of its gay employees could not
withstand scrutiny under Montana’s equal protection clause).
37

See supra n. 5 (discussing the implied state action requirement contained in the amendments).

38

Unmarried heterosexual employees who work for public entities and qualify for domestic partner benefits are also
threatened with the loss of partner coverage, but this Article will focus on gay and lesbian employees.

39
See e.g., Alaska (Ala. Const. art. I, § 25), Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II, § 31), Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23),
Mississippi (Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A), Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33), Montana (Mont. Const. art. XIII, §
7), Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21), Oregon (Or. Const. art. XV, § 5), and Tennessee (Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18).
40

See e.g., Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774), Arkansas (Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4),
Idaho (Idaho Const. art. III, § XXVIII), Kansas (Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16), Kentucky (Ky. Const. pt. 2, § 233A),
Louisiana (La. Const. art. XII, §15), Michigan (Mich. Const. art. I, § 25), Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29), North
Dakota (N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11), Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, § 35), South
Carolina (S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15), South Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9), Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32),
Utah (Utah Const. art. I, § 29), Virginia (Va. Const. art. I, § 15), and Wisconsin (Wis. art. XIII, § 13).
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amendment?41 Moreover, if it did, is this the outcome that the voters had in mind when they
voted in favor of the marriage amendments?

B.

Comparative Model MSAs and Voter Intent

As noted above, the marriage amendments can be broken down into two categories. Nine
of the twenty-seven amendments – the Single-Subject Amendments (“SSAs”) – focus
exclusively on defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman. The SSA states are
Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee.42
By contrast, the remaining amendments – the Multi-Subject Amendments (“MSAs”) – not only
limit marriage to heterosexual unions but also prohibit state courts and legislatures from creating
or recognizing unions that are similar in some fashion to marriage.43 Finally, the MSAs
themselves break down into the Incidents Model MSAs and the Comparative Model MSAs.
Generally speaking, the Comparative Model MSAs not only bar states from treating
same-sex unions as marriages, but also from creating or recognizing a legal status for any
41

One particular source of concern is the continued validity of partner benefits programs offered by local
governments across the country. Within the states whose amendments are especially problematic, the following
localities may find their policies subject to challenge: Fayetteville, Arkansas; Atlanta, Georgia; Decatur, Georgia;
DeKalb County, Georgia; Fulton County, Georgia; City of Moscow, Idaho; New Orleans, Louisiana; Detroit,
Michigan; East Lansing, Michigan; Ingham County, Michigan; Washtenaw County, Michigan; Cleveland Heights,
Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Travis County, Texas; Arlington County, Virginia; Dane County, Wisconsin;
La Crosse County, Wisconsin; Madison, Wisconsin; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER DOMESTIC PARTNER HEALTH BENEFITS (2007), available at
www.hrc.org/workplace/dpbsearch (last visited on Feb. 26, 2008); see also Intervening Defendants’ Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Ralph v. City of New Orleans, No. 2003-9871
(listing numerous local governments across the country that offer domestic partner benefits packages for
employees); City of Moscow, Health Insurance Policy, Idaho Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 3 (2008) (concluding that the City of
Moscow, Idaho likely violated the state marriage amendment when it implemented a benefits plan for the domestic
partners of its employees).
42

See Alaska (Ala. Const. art. I, § 25), Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II, § 31), Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23),
Mississippi (Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A), Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33), Montana (Mont. Const. art. XIII, §
7), Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21), Oregon (Or. Const. art. XV, § 5), and Tennessee (Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18).
Hawaii’s SSA is unique in that it grants the legislature exclusive authority to limit marriage to a man and a women.
See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples”).

43

See Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774), Arkansas,(Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4), Idaho
(Idaho Const. art. III, § 28), Kansas (Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16), Kentucky (Ky. Const. pt. 2, § 233A), Louisiana
(La. Const. art. XII, §15), Michigan (Mich. Const. art. I, § 25), Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29), North Dakota
(N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11), Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, § 35), South Carolina
(S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15), South Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9) , Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32), Utah (Utah
Const. art. I, § 29), Virginia (Va. Const. art. I, § 15), and Wisconsin (Wis. art. XIII, § 13). By way of comparison,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont have passed civil unions statutes which guarantee gay and
lesbian couples all of the same rights that married heterosexual couples receive under state law. See e.g. VT. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000) Similarly, California, Oregon, and Washington have created equally generous regimes,
but rather than using the “civil unions” terminology, they instead use the term “domestic partnership.” See e.g. Cal.
Family Code § 297 2005. Finally, Maine and Hawaii offer limited protection to committed gay and lesbian
relationships. See e.g. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.5, § 4572 (2005).
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unmarried relationship. Meeting this latter prohibition, however, will not itself violate the
amendment. Instead, the policy in question must also violate a final provision in the amendment
– one which identifies the degree of similarity to traditional marriage that the amendments
permit. In a Comparative Model regime, then, a gay or lesbian public employee may lose (or
never acquire) partner benefits when two conditions are met: (1) if the state has conferred a legal
status on his or her relationship, and (2) if that status is sufficiently close to marriage to violate
the similarity provision. Conversely, even if a status has been conferred on the relationship, the
employee should receive partner benefits if that status is not close enough to marriage to violate
the similarity provision. Ultimately, the scope of the prohibition depends on the language of the
amendments, and they become operative under one of three circumstances: (1) if the creation or
recognition of a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals is identical to marriage;
(2) if the creation or recognition of a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals is
identical or substantially similar to marriage; or (3) if the creation or recognition of a legal status
for unmarried individuals is similar to marriage.44 The meaning of these terms is arguably
unclear: What does it mean to have a “legal status”? If the language of the amendment
specifically precludes the recognition of a “union” rather than a “legal status,” does recognition
of the union imply the existence of a “legal status”? What does it mean to “recognize” a “union”
or a “legal status”? If an amendment prohibits the creation or recognition of a legal status that is
“similar” to marriage, at what point do resemblances rise to the level of improper “similarity”?
The ambiguity of the language in the Comparative Model MSAs suggests a rather
troubling conclusion: the voters who passed the amendment may not have truly understood the
potential of their operative scope. This, then, begs an important preliminary question: why did
they approve the amendments in the first place? The answer to this question is hinted at by two
sources of information: (1) the sections of the amendments that are clear, and (2) the political
context in which the amendments were adopted. As noted, all of the amendments contain
explicit prohibitions on same-sex marriage: gay and lesbian couples may neither get married in
these states nor expect recognition if they marry in other states.45 Popular disapproval of gay
marriage was quite strong, and it is possible that the voters’ approval of the anti-marriage
provisions would have outweighed any concerns about the ambiguous provisions.
Beyond that, the political context surrounding the amendments inspired worry in some
voters that their preferences were at risk of being ignored. The near-validation of same-sex
marriage in Baehr, its actual validation in Goodridge, and the spate of illegal marriage
ceremonies around the country made some voters fear that gay marriage was just a court decision
or renegade mayoral action away.46 Moreover, state supreme courts in Vermont and New Jersey
forced their legislatures to implement civil union legislation, once again taking a decision about
the status of same-sex relationships out of the hands of the people.47 Undoubtedly, many voters
44

See Appendix 1.

45

See Appendices 1-3.

46

See, e.g., Jameel Naqvi, Proposal Would Entrench Gay Marriage Ban, MICHIGAN DAILY, October 28, 2004
(“Kristina Hemphill, spokeswoman for Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, which collected the required
signatures to put the proposal on the ballot, said an amendment would ‘keep Michigan from going through the fiasco
that has occurred in other states.’”); see also Okla. Const. art. 2, § 34(C) (“Any person knowingly issuing a marriage
license in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
47

See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) ; see also Lewis v. Harris, 98 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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were motivated by twin concerns: a desire to reserve marriage and its privileges exclusively for
heterosexuals, and a fear that they would have no role in defining the emerging position of gays
and lesbians in society. In every state except for Arizona, voters removed the marriage question
from the arena of debate.48
The striking success of the anti-gay marriage movement shows that this issue is the
Waterloo of progress for equality advocates. Nonetheless, the American public seems ready to
extend some benefits and protections to gays and lesbians, as shown by the fact that 55 percent of
Americans support civil unions for gay couples, as well as the fact that several states have
already moved in this direction.49 These numbers reflect a growing shift in perception about gay
acceptability within our culture, as evidenced by political and cultural changes which have
almost certainly left their mark. Gays and lesbians are “coming out” to their friends and families
at increasingly younger ages.50 Anti-gay bias is on the decline.51 Twenty states and the District
of Columbia prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.52 Twelve of those states
and the District of Columbia also prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity.53 Gay
contestants on reality shows like Project Runway enjoy widespread popularity, and dramas like
Mad Men, The L Word, The Wire, and The Shield offer a sophisticated vision of the complexity
of gay and lesbian lives.54 Gays and lesbians are gradually becoming a normalized segment of
mainstream American life.

48

William Butte, California’s Decisions Could Affect Florida, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2008, p.
25A (discussing the defeat of the marriage amendment in Arizona).
49

See, e.g., Gary Langer, Poll: Support for Civil Unions Rises, Yet Sharp Divisions Remain (Nov. 8, 2007),
available at http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=3834625&page=1.

50

See, e.g., Average Coming-Out Age Now 13 (Oct. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2006/10/11/4 (discussing the fact that gays and lesbians are public
announcing their sexuality at earlier ages in their lives).
51

See, e.g., American Prejudice, ZOGBY INTERNAT’L (July 2007), available at
http://www.zogby.com/gsn/GSNReport.pdf (finding that 87% of Americans believe that gays and lesbians should be
free from workplace discrimination); but see Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2006 Hate Crime
Statistics (Nov. 2007) (noting that approximately 15.5% of hate crimes committed in 2006 were motivated by sexual
orientation bias), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2006/pressrelease.html.
52

Those states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES,
www.hrc.org/state_laws (last updated November 26, 2007).
53

See id.

54

Each show referenced above has done a masterful job of including (or focusing on) gay and lesbian
contestants/characters: A disproportionate number of the male contestants on Bravo’s Project Runway are openly
gay; AMC’s Mad Men, set on Madison Avenue in the pre-Stonewall 1960s, features two recurring characters who
struggle with the loneliness of the closet; Showtime’s The L Word is a glossy soap opera devoted to the romantic
entanglements of a group of lesbian friends; HBO’s The Wire features both a well-respected lesbian police officer
and a gay lone wolf gangster who steals drug stashes from the major players in town while armed with a sawed-off
shotgun; and finally, FX’s The Shield showed the “ex-gay” movement through the eyes of a deeply religious gay
police officer who rejected his sexuality. See Project Runway,
http://www.bravotv.com/Project_Runway//index.php; see also Mad Men,
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How, then, can one reconcile these changes with the fact that voters across the country
supported the Comparative Model MSAs by very comfortable margins? The nation’s growing
support for gays and lesbians notwithstanding, the evidence reflects a deep ambivalence about
the name that we give to gay and lesbian relationships. Many would argue that the most
important “name,” or label, that one can place on a relationship is “marriage,” and voters were
clearly not ready to extend to gays and lesbians this measure of equal social regard. The growing
approval of civil unions does not undermine this claim – even though the numbers suggest that
more people are acknowledging both the humanity of gays and lesbians and the urgency of their
practical needs, many of these supporters still balk at conferring the dignity attached to the label
“marriage.” At best, then, civil unions represent a compromise position: committed gays and
lesbians receive the tangible benefits of marriage, but the most important intangible benefit
remains out of reach.
The Comparative Model MSAs, of course, reject this compromise. Voters who approved
these amendments chose to deny gays and lesbians access to both the name of marriage and the
universe of its attendant benefits. This position is consistent with a view which holds that civil
unions are nothing more than marriage by another name, and from the standpoint of consistency,
if a voter rejects same-sex marriage, he or she should reject civil unions, too. The desire to
protect both the name and the substance of marriage created an impulse in the drafters that was
frankly too clever: anticipating efforts by legislators or judges to create a civil union equivalent
by another name, the drafters included broad, prohibitory language in the amendments that
simply covered too much ground.
As a result, these amendments threaten consequences for gay and lesbian couples that are
potentially devastating. Ohio and Utah, for instance, have domestic violence statutes which
cover unmarried couples who are “living as spouses” (including gay and lesbian couples).55 To
date, both states have considered claims that the application of these statutes to individuals who
are “living as spouses” recognizes a legal status that is similar to marriage, in violation of the
terms of their respective amendments.56 In addition, the Nebraska Attorney General considered
whether the legislature could pass a statute, consistent with its marriage amendment, allowing an
individual’s domestic partner to donate organs from the decedent.57 The Attorney General
concluded that doing so would violate the terms of the marriage amendment.58 The most
significant challenges are occurring in those states whose public entities offer benefits to the
domestic partners of their gay and lesbian employees: the Kentucky Senate, for instance, has
passed a bill that would prohibit public entities from implementing partner benefit policies; the
Idaho Attorney General has issued an opinion finding that a town’s decision to offer such
benefits likely violated the state constitution; a Salt Lake City trial court found that a provision in
http://www.amctv.com/originals/madmen/; The L Word, http://www.sho.com/site/lword/home.do; The Wire,
http://www.hbo.com/thewire/; The Shield, http://www.fxnetworks.com/shows/originals/the_shield/main.html.
55
See discussion infra, Part III; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(2)(b) (2008).
56
See discussion infra, Part III ; see also National Briefing Gay Marriage: Get Ready for Congressional Slugfest
Round Two, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Vol. 10, No. 9, November 15, 2004 (noting that a Salt Lake City
attorney had recently filed a motion to dismiss domestic violence charges against her client, arguing that Utah’s
recently passed marriage amendment made the application of the statute unconstitutional to her unmarried client).
57

See Nebraska Op. Att’y Gen. No. 03004 (Mar. 10, 2003).

58

See id.
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the city’s Public Employees Health Program extending coverage to the “Adult Designee” of an
employee did not violate the state marriage amendment;59 and finally, litigation is ongoing over
this issue in Ohio, Louisiana, and Michigan.60 This last set of examples poses a crucial question
that the courts in those states are either in the process of answering, or may find themselves
called upon to answer: does the language in each state’s respective amendment prevent public
entities from offering their gay and lesbian employees domestic partner benefits plans?
Currently, the Michigan Supreme Court is reviewing a dispute that will likely have a
persuasive impact on courts across the nation, and thus far, neither the trial court nor the
appellate court has offered an analysis of the problem that is altogether persuasive. In National
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor, the question before the Court is whether Michigan’s marriage
amendment precludes the state from offering health care benefits to the domestic partners of its
gay and lesbian employees. Part Two will offer an extensive analysis of this case, given its
significance in the current debate.
II.

National Pride at Work, Inc., et al. v. Governor of Michigan
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Backdrop

Shortly after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that same-sex marriage
would be legal in its state, a member of the Michigan State Legislature proposed that a
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage be placed before the Michigan voters.61
The proposed amendment failed, however, when it did not garner the required two-thirds
majority.62 Soon thereafter, the Michigan Christian Citizen’s Alliance started an initiative
committee in an effort to achieve the same end.63 This committee – Citizens for the Protection of
Marriage – successfully collected more than 500,000 signatures on a petition demanding that the
proposed amendment be placed on the November ballot.64 On November 2, 2004, voters in the
59

See In re Utah State Retirement Board, No. 050916879 (Utah D. Ct. 2006), available at http:
www.acluutah.org/normanruling.pdf. Salt Lake City defined “Adult Designee” as “a [dependent] person, not the
spouse of the employee, who has resided in the domicile of the eligible employee for not less tha[n] twelve
consecutive months and intends to continue to do so, is at least eighteen years old, and is economically dependent on
or interdependent with the eligible employee.” See id.
60

See Brinkman v. Miami Univ., 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007); see also Ralph v. City of New
Orleans, No. 2003-09871, Civ. D. Ct. Parish of Orleans (Jan. 15, 2008); Nat’l Pride at Work v. Governor, 732
N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (discussed infra Part II).
61
Wedding Wall: Balloted gay marriage ban denies equal protection, The Michigan Daily, July 6, 2004,
http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2004/07/06/Opinioneditorials/Wedding.Wall1424382.shtml (last visited on November 12, 2007) (hereinafter “Wedding Wall”).
62

See id.

63

See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, State of Michigan (Supreme Court) (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Brief”),
dated August 30, 2007, at 7.
64

See Chris Killian, Michigan Split on Marriage Proposal, October 14, 2004, at
http://media.www.westernherald.com/media/storage/paper881/news/2004/10/14/News/Michigan.Split.On.Marriage.
Proposal-2123912.shtml (last visited on November 12, 2007). The petition was quite successful – supporters needed
only approximately 318,000 signatures in order to win a spot on the ballot.
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state of Michigan passed the marriage amendment, which states as follows: “To secure and
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union
of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or
similar union for any purpose.”65 One of eleven same-sex marriage amendments to pass
nationwide that day, Michigan’s amendment was approved by 59% of the voters.66 It was a clear
victory for same-sex marriage opponents and an expected defeat for proponents of gay and
lesbian rights.67
Even though the language of the Michigan amendment is somewhat opaque, its primary
purpose is simple and straightforward – voters intended to eliminate the68 possibility of same-sex
marriage in the state of Michigan.69 More ambiguous, however, is the exact import of the
“similar union” language. Voters certainly meant to block the creation of civil unions, their
functional equivalent, or any other publicly cognizable union between an unmarried couple that
was similar the marital union.70 Nevertheless, the contours of the prohibition are unclear. Did
the ban extend only to the creation of comprehensive parallel regimes like those in Vermont,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, California, and Oregon, each one of which allows gay and lesbian
residents to enter into publicly-acknowledged relationships that are treated like marriage under
state law?71 Or did it also extend to the creation of regimes like those in Washington, Hawaii,
Maine, and the District of Columbia, where gay and lesbian relationships receive limited public
acknowledgement and protection under state law?72 Would it negatively impact the ability of
gay and lesbian couples to adopt or foster children?73 Would it limit the ability of gay and
straight unmarried couples to receive protection under the domestic violence statutes?74
Questions regarding the scope of the “similar union” language had an immediate practical
impact in Michigan. Many state employers at the time of passage had policies or contractual
65

See Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (2004).

66

See Protect Our Families Michigan, at http://protectmifamilies.org/teir.php?page=21 (last visited on November
12, 2007).
67

Dawson Bell, Proprosal 2: Gay Marriage Ban Easily Wins in State, Elsewhere; Constitutional Amendment Has
Strong Support Across the Board, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, at 9A.
68
See id. (”Michigan was one of 11 states to adopt constitutional amendments on marriage, signaling a strong
grassroots reaction to court decisions permitting same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and decisions by local officials
in various places to permit gay and lesbian couples to marry.”).
69

See id.

70

See id.

71

See supra n. 24.

72

See supra n. 23.

73

See Danielle Epstein & Lena Mukherjee, Note, Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers Same-Sex Couples Face in
Their Quest to Become a Family Unit, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 782, 800 (1997) (arguing that a
significant consequence of failing to recognize same-sex marriage is the denial of benefits reserved for legally
married couples, including the right to adopt and raise a family).
74

See infra, Part III (discussing the experience of the Ohio courts when evaluating this question).
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agreements in place which offered health-care benefits to the domestic partners of gay and
lesbian employees.75 The passage of the amendment seemed to render doubtful the continued
validity of those policies and agreements. One such proposed agreement existed between
Michigan’s Office of State Employer (“OSE”) and its employees who were represented by the
United Auto Workers (“UAW”) union. On October 24, 2004, OSE and UAW entered into a
tentative agreement that, for the first time, included health care and family medical leave benefits
for the same-sex domestic partners of UAW members.76 In order to qualify for the benefits,
however, the domestic partners had to meet certain eligibility criteria laid out in the Letter of
Understanding between the OSE and the UAW. The eligibility criteria were as follows:
(1) Be at least 18 years of age.
(2) Share a close personal relationship with the employee and be responsible for
each other’s common welfare.
(3) Not have a similar relationship with any other person, and not have had a
similar relationship with any other person for the prior six months.
(4) Not be a member of the employee’s immediate family as defined as
employee’s spouse, children, parents, grandparents, or foster parents,
grandchildren, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles or cousins.
(5) Be of the same gender.
(6) Have jointly shared the same regular and permanent residence for at least six
months, and have an intent to continue doing so indefinitely.
(7) Be jointly responsible for basic living expenses, including the cost of food,
shelter and other common expenses of maintaining a household. This joint
responsibility need not mean that the persons contribute equally or in any
particular ratio, but rather that the persons agree that they are jointly
responsible.77
After the passage of the Marriage Amendment, OSE and UAW became especially concerned
about the legality of the proposed agreement.78 Rather than submitting the proposed agreement
to the Civil Service Commission for ratification, OSE and the UAW agreed to delay their
submission until a court held that the proposed contract was legal.79
75

For example, Michigan State University, prior to June 2007, offered health insurance benefits to employees in
same-sex domestic partnerships. See Colleen Maxwell, Michigan University Stops Same-Sex Benefits, June 6, 2007
at http://www.afamichigan.org/2007/06/08/state-news-michigan-state-university-stops-same-sex-benefits/ (last
visited Feb. 28th, 2008).
76

See Brief of Amici Curiae Internat’l Union, UAW and Its Local 6000 in Support of [P]laintiffs-Appellants, in the
Supreme Court, dated August 13, 2007, at 1.
77

See id., Ex. 2, Letter of Understanding, Article 43, Section C (dated December 3, 2004) (hereinafter “Letter of
Understanding”).
78

See id. at 1-2.

79
See supra n. 22, Letter of Understanding (outlining the criteria which established eligible dependency for samesex domestic partners and describing the parties’ intent to postpone ratification of the agreement until a court
declared that the agreement did not violate the Marriage Amendment).
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The proposed agreement between the OSE and UAW was not the only contract that was
potentially threatened by the open-ended language of the amendment. Despite public
reassurances provided by its backers that the proposed amendment would not threaten benefit
plans,80 it was nonetheless clear that the ambiguous language did, in fact, raise important
questions about the full effect of the amendment. Specific concerns were raised about the
validity of plans implemented by state universities, with a particular emphasis on the University
of Michigan, as well as plans implemented by localities like the City of Kalamazoo.81
The policy implemented by the University of Michigan came under scrutiny as questions
about the viability of these partner benefit plans became more intense.82 The university defended
its plan as necessary to attract the kind of intellectual talent that supported the continued strength
of its reputation for excellence, and argued that the voters did not intend to restrict its ability to
offer these plans when they supported the amendment.83 Under the terms of the university’s
benefit plan, a same-sex domestic partner meets the eligibility requirements if the following
criteria are met: the person was (1) of the same sex as the employee; (2) unmarried; (3)
unrelated by blood to the employee in a manner that would have precluded marriage if the option
was available; (4) uncovered by the university’s plan (i.e. cannot be a university employee); (5)
registered as the employee’s domestic partner in their particular locality; (6) more than six
months away from the termination of a previous domestic partner relationship with another
person.84
Similarly, the City of Kalamazoo implemented a plan in 2000 which offered health care
benefits to all employees and their domestic partners.85 Individuals qualified as domestic
partners under the City of Kalamazoo’s plan if they met the following requirements: (1) were of
the same gender; (2) were at least 18 years and had the mental competence to enter into a
contract; (3) were sharing and had shared a common residence for at least six months; (4) were
unmarried and were not related in a manner that would have precluded them from marrying
under the Michigan statutes; (5) shared their finances and living expenses; and (6) had signed a
80

A representative of Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, which sponsored the initiative resulting in the
placement of the marriage amendment on the ballot, described the impact of the proposed amendment for the
Michigan Board of Canvassers, which was responsible for certifying the ballot proposal. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s
Brief on Appeal, dated August 30, 2007, at 7. He argued that the amendment would not “preclude the public
employer from extending . . . benefits, if they so chose, as a matter of contract between employer and employee. . .
.” Id. at 8.
81

See Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005), at **1-2 (describing the
structure of the health-benefit plan implemented by defendant City of Kalamazoo, as well as a similar plan
implemented by the University of Michigan).
82

Even though it is not a party to the National Pride at Work litigation, the University of Michigan’s plan was
analyzed by both the trial court and the court of appeals. [cite]
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See Brief of the Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Governors of Wayne State University, Central
Michigan Board of Trustees, the Board of Control of Northern Michigan University, Michigan Technological
University, Saginaw Valley State University, and the Board of Regents of Eastern Michigan University as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants, in the Supreme Court of Michigan, dated August 24, 2007, at 3, 20.
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See id. Ex. 1, p. 3.

85

See id. at *1.
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Certification of Domestic Partnership.86 Currently, the city is a defendant in the National Pride
at Work litigation and is defending the constitutionality of its benefit plan.
Shortly after the passage of the amendment, the plan offered by the City of Kalamazoo
inspired State Representative Jacob W. Hoogendyk, Jr. to seek an attorney general opinion
regarding its constitutionality. Michael Cox, the Michigan Attorney General, concluded that
“the City’s policy of offering benefits to same-sex domestic partners violates the amendment’s
prohibition against recognizing any ‘similar union’ other than the union of one man and woman
in marriage.”87 In his opinion, the Attorney General identified the purpose of the amendment as
protecting the “social, legal, and financial benefits [of marriage] uniquely [for] married men and
women.”88 Viewing the rest of the amendment in light of this purpose, he concluded that the
language was “best interpreted as prohibiting the acknowledgement of both same-sex
relationships and unmarried opposite-sex relationships.”89 Since the City of Kalamazoo arguably
granted formally-registered domestic partners a status that was similar to marriage, tying the
receipt of benefits to an employee’s status as one half of a domestic partnership was a
“recognition or acknowledgement of the validity of . . . same-sex relationships.”90 As such, the
policy violated the amendment.91 On April 18, 2005, the City of Kalamazoo announced its
intention to discontinue the benefits plan, effective January 1, 2006, unless a court ruled that the
policy was legal.92 Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed their action in National Pride at Work.
B.

National Pride at Work – Trial Court decision

The trial court in National Pride at Work described the question before it as follows:
“[W]hether a public employer may voluntarily, either through the collective bargaining process
or otherwise, agree to provide its employees with so-called “same sex benefits.”93 The benefits
at issue were primarily health-care benefits meant to cover the domestic partner of the employee
in question.94 Benefits programs offered by defendant City of Kalamazoo, as well as the State of

86

See id. at *2.

87

Opinion No. 7171, Office of the Attorney General, State of Michigan, 2005 WL 639112 (March 16, 2005).

88

Id.

89

Id. (emphasis added).

90

Id.

91
See id. The Attorney General also found that the prohibition contained in the amendment operated prospectively
only. Therefore, contracts which were already in existence prior to the effective date of the amendment would not be
impacted. See id.
92

See Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005), at *2.

93
Id., at *1. The question addressed by the trial court actually mischaracterized the true issue – the impact of the
prohibition potentially established by the amendment was not confined to same-same relationships; it also extended
to heterosexual domestic partnerships. See id.
94

See id.
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Michigan95 and the University of Michigan, served as illustrative examples for purposes of the
court’s analysis.
The trial court grounded its analysis in the rules governing constitutional interpretation in
the state of Michigan. The most significant rules guiding the court’s analysis were the direction
to “give[] [the words] their plain meaning at the time of ratification,” and to implement “[t]he
meaning . . . which realizes the intent of the people who ratified the Constitution.”96 Courts were
certainly allowed to consider the circumstances surrounding adoption when the language was
ambiguous, but in this case, the language was sufficiently clear to avoid resort to extrinsic
evidence of the voters’ intent.97
The trial court identified the very first phrase of the amendment – “to secure and
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children” – as
support for its claim that the voters had clearly stated their intent. 98 According to the trial court,
the opening language of the amendment evinced the overriding purpose of preserving the
statutory benefits of marriage – benefits which did not include a guarantee of health care.99
Individuals did not receive health-care benefits as a matter of statutory right as soon as they were
married; rather, the receipt of health-care benefits was simply a function of the employment
relationship: “If a spouse receives health care benefits, it is a result of a contractual provision or
policy directive of the employer.”100 The circumstances under which these benefits were
dispensed were not governed by the creation and implementation of legal rules. Rather,
eligibility for the receipt of these benefits depended entirely on the employees’ ability to meet
the criteria established by their respective employers.101
After interpreting the opening language of the amendment in this manner, it appeared that
there was nothing left to decide. If the “benefits” described in the amendment referred only to
the statutory benefits that arose as a consequence of marriage, and if health-care benefits did not
fall into that category, then presumably the state employee plans were not covered by the terms
of the amendment. The trial court, however, did not end its analysis here. Focusing on the word
“recognize,” the court next considered the meaning of the second major phrase in the
amendment: “the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union.”102 The Michigan Attorney General argued that the
state “recognized” a union by acknowledging its existence and premising the receipt of benefits
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on its existence.103 Plaintiff National Pride at Work, on the other hand, argued that “recognition”
of a relationship would require the state, as a sovereign entity, to bestow a formal status on a
non-marital union or offer individuals in such unions guaranteed rights.104 Since the employee
benefit plans did not accomplish either end, there was no “recognition” within the meaning of the
amendment.105
The trial court, however, declined to take either approach suggested by the parties.
Instead, it chose a third approach – it proposed to interpret “recognize” in light of the purpose
animating the specific provision within which the word was contained. Once again, the purpose
of this section of the amendment was apparent on the face of the amendment: to ensure that
“only a union between one man and one woman [would] be recognized ‘as a marriage or similar
union.’”106 In an ostensible effort to effectuate this purpose, the trial court asked whether the
eligibility criteria themselves, rather than the state’s decision to premise the receipt of benefits on
meeting these criteria, recognized a marriage or a similar union.107 After quickly dispensing with
the notion that recognition of marriage was at stake, the trial court further concluded that the
criteria did not, in fact, recognize a similar union.108 As an initial matter, no union arose from
the criteria.109 Moreover, the criteria differed from employer to employer, providing yet another
basis for failing to find any recognition within the meaning of the amendment.110 Finally, the
trial court argued that “the criteria could not be said to create a union where one [did] not exist
according to law.”111
Even if the criteria had “recognized” a union, the trial court would have held that they did
not recognize a union “similar to marriage.”112 Once again relying on an understanding of
marriage that was rooted in the statutory regime that defined the duties and benefits of marriage,
the trial court argued that the eligibility criteria for health-care benefits established by the state
employers “pale[d] in comparison to the myriad . . . legal rights and responsibilities accorded to
those with marital status.”113 Comparison of the specific statutory rights and duties that arise
through marriage, as well as the method of termination and the legal consequences that flow
103
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from the end of a marriage, persuaded the court that no union similar to marriage was implicated
by the health-care benefits programs:
The criteria in the present case do not come close to approaching the legal status
that marriage holds in our society. The relationship between the employee and the
covered dependent, not being defined by law, is left to the parties to define
privately. The criteria neither reflect that nor recognize that. The criteria define
eligibility for health insurance benefits and do not act as recognition of a union
similar to marriage. 114
Ultimately, the trial court held that the marriage amendment did not apply to the state
employer health-care benefit plans. Therefore, state employers were not barred by the
amendment from offering partner benefits to their unmarried employees.115
C.

National Pride at Work – Court of Appeals decision

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. Framing the question before it in slightly
different manner, the Court of Appeals considered “[w]hether a public employer’s extension of
employment benefits, e.g., same-sex domestic-partnership benefits, [was] based on an agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union. . . .” 116 If it was, then the benefits were invalid:
“The operative language of the amendment plainly precludes the extension of benefits related to
an employment contract if the benefits are conditioned on or provided because of an agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union.”117 Thus, even though both courts were ultimately
focused on the authority of state employers to act in the way that they did, the Court of Appeals
question was more precisely attuned to the central debate that was pending before it.
This difference between the two opinions notwithstanding, both courts began at the same
analytical starting place. Much like the trial court, the Court of Appeals opened the substantive
portion of its analysis by identifying the primary rules of constitutional interpretation on which
Michigan courts rely.118 Also, much like the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the
“mandate” of the amendment was clear: “that only one ‘agreement’ – the union of one man and
one woman in marriage – may be recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”119
In doing so, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed the trial court’s view that the amendment’s
114
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statement of purpose – “to secure and preserve the benefits of marriage” – was effectively
identical to its mandate.120
Central to the court’s analysis was the meaning of the word “recognize.” The court held
that “the common understanding of the term ‘recognize’ as used in the amendment is [meant] in
a legal sense, i.e., to acknowledge the validity of something.”121 The question, then, was whether
the policy in question acknowledged the validity of a relationship similar to marriage when it
premised partner eligibility for health-care benefits on the existence of a close, personal
relationship. The court made two analytical moves here: (1) it considered whether the
requirement that the couples be in a domestic partnership of some sort demonstrated that an
“agreement” was at stake, and (2) it compared domestic partnerships to marriage. Insofar as
“agreements” were concerned, the Court of Appeals noted that “the employee and the
employee’s eligible dependent must have agreed to be jointly responsible for basic living
expenses and other common expenses of maintaining a household.”122 The court went on to note
the following: “Upon being advised of the existence of the employer-required agreement, the
employer is contractually, i.e., legally, obligated to recognize the agreement for the purpose of
providing health-care benefits to the dependent.”123 Under the terms of these policies, then, the
public entity acquired a legally enforceable obligation upon proof that the employee and his or
her partner had agreed to embrace a relationship that the marriage amendment had arguably
rendered invisible to the law.124
The state’s acknowledgement of the agreement was meaningless, though, if the
agreement was not similar to marriage. In order to evaluate this issue, it was necessary for the
court to have an understanding of what marriage meant, and then to measure domestic
partnerships against that understanding. Starting with the definition of marriage, the court found
that the institution was defined by the Michigan Code as “a unique relationship between a man
and a woman . . . . [that the] state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and
protecting . . . in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its
children.”125 Myriad rights, responsibilities, benefits, and privileges were available to and
imposed upon married couples as they entered an institution that was simultaneously private,
public and social in its conception:
Marriage is a civil contract, but it is not a pure private contract. It is affected with
a public interest and by a public policy. The status of children, preservation of the
home, private morality, public decency, and the like afford ample grounds for
special treatment of marriage as a contract, by statute and decision. In recognition
120
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of its public and social nature, courts have cast about it the protecting mantle of
presumptions, sustaining validity of marriage, said to be the strongest known to
the law.126
Even though domestic partnership agreements did not carry with them the same social caché or
legal significance, and further, did not give rise to the same welter of rights and responsibilities,
they were nonetheless similar in certain crucial ways to marriage. First of all, domestic
partnership agreements were created in order to “proclaim the existence of the relationship by
establishing a mechanism for the public expression, sanction, and documentation of the
commitment.”127 Second, the entry requirements for the domestic partnership agreements in the
record were comparable to those for marriage: (1) there was a gender requirement; (2) there was
a need for the consent of the parties to the relationship; (3) there was a need to prove that the
parties were not blood relations; (4) there was a need to ensure that no marriages are similar
relationships existed for either of the parties; and (5) there was a minimum age requirement.128
In light of these similarities, the trial court erred when it held that the prohibition of the
amendment did not apply to the benefit plans that were at issue here.
D.

Critique of the Analyses Employed by the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
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Trial Court Critique

Even though the trial court reached a result that was vitally important for a minority
population in the state, the manner in which it reached the result created more problems than it
solved. The trial court began its analysis by asking the right question: “[W]hether a public
employer may voluntarily, either through the collective bargaining process or otherwise, agree to
provide its employees with so-called ‘same-sex benefits.’”129 It ran into difficulty, though, when
it began to interpret the meaning of the word “recognize.”
As it began its analysis of “recognize,” the court noted the different positions taken by the
plaintiffs and the Attorney General. The plaintiffs argued that the word “refer[red] to the State of
Michigan [i]n its sovereignty conferring some status or rights on the union.”130 By way of
contrast, the Attorney General argued that “the word ‘recognize’ [meant] acknowledg[ing] the
existence of something and that any benefit at all that is provided to a same-sex union would
acknowledge the existence of that union.”131 Rejecting both approaches, the trial court instead
opted not to define the word at all.
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Rather than offering a straightforward meaning of the word that could be applied to the
facts before the court, the trial court argued that “[n]either the common meaning of recognize nor
examination of that word in isolation allow[ed] for a determination of the intended meaning.”132
It was necessary to look at both the definitional sense of the word, as well as the underlying
purpose which animated the provision in which the word was found.133 Looking at the
provision, the court found that it was unambiguous: “The provision requires that only a union
between one man and one woman will be recognized ‘as a marriage or a similar union.’” Clearly,
the benefits in question were not based on marriage, so the question was whether “the criteria
act[ed] as recognition of ‘a union similar to marriage.’”134
The court answered this question by focusing on whether or not a union arose from or
was created by the designated criteria; if a union had arisen from the criteria, one could then say
that the state had recognized a status. The court made three arguments: (1) no union arose from
the criteria themselves because they did nothing more than establish eligibility for receiving the
benefits; (2) no union arose from the criteria because they differed by employer; thereby
negating the possibility of public recognition of a status, and (3) no union was created by the
criteria because one could not create a union where one did not exist according to law.135
The court’s analysis in this case was somewhat problematic. As an initial matter, both
the plaintiffs and the Attorney General offered reasonable definitions of the word “recognize,”136
definitions that would encompass a union that did, in fact, “arise” from the stated criteria. If a
union did arise from the criteria designated by the state agency, then the state would have created
a status for that relationship by establishing it formally within the law. Moreover, if a union arose
from the criteria, the state would, by definition, be acknowledging it, precisely because it had
created it. The court, however, seemed to imply that recognition would occur only if the state
gave these unions a formal status designation in the law, and nothing of the sort had happened
here.137 This claim would have been more persuasive if the court had offered better arguments in
support of it.138
The analysis became substantially weaker with its second point – no union arose from the
criteria because they differed by employer. The response to this argument is evident: the criteria
in question need not be uniform in order for the union to exist, or for the union to be recognized
by the state. In fact, it is common for domestic partner plans to vary from employer to employer,
but the fact of variance does not support a claim of non-recognition. As will be discussed in
greater detail, if a public employer confers a status on an individual, and if consequences are
132

Id.

133

See id.

134

Id.

135

See id.

136

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “recognition” as “[r]atification; confirmation; an acknowledgment that
something done by another person in one’s name had one’s authority.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (17th ed.
2000). This definition actually encompasses both the plaintiffs’ and the Attorney General’s positions.
137

In fact, the court seemed to accept the plaintiffs’ definition of “recognize” without actually saying so.

138

See infra Part III (extended discussion of a more persuasive definition of “recognize”).

23

triggered when the individual achieves that status, one can reasonably argue that the status has
been recognized by the employer.139 This analysis of recognition does not depend on the
uniformity of the criteria which confer the status; it merely depends on the action taken by the
public employer itself.140 Again, if the court wished to offer an alternative account of the
meaning of recognition, it needed to bolster the argument with more analysis than it offered in
this case. Finally, the last point raised was simply odd. The court argued that a union could not
be created by the criteria if the union did not already exist. If the purpose of the criteria was to
create a union that would be formally recognized under the law, then presumably, the union was
not already in existence. If the union already existed, there would be no need to create the same
union. The court’s analysis of the word “recognize” is largely unpersuasive.
The court continued its unsatisfactory analysis when it turned to the meaning of the word
“union.” It suggested that the Attorney General’s argument – that the employers were
recognizing “unions” because they turned on the existence of a “relationship” – was flawed
because the plans were not entirely based on the existence of a relationship.141 The court
acknowledged that the plans established by the state of Michigan and the University of Michigan
did require proof of a relationship in order to establish eligibility for the benefits;142 nevertheless,
it found that the existence of a relationship was not key because “the benefits terminate upon
termination of employment even if a relationship between the parties continues.”143 Moreover,
the existence of a relationship was only one requirement for eligibility – if other requirements
were not met, the request for coverage would be denied.144 The plans simply allowed employers
to provide voluntarily “health insurance benefits to those who [met] certain criteria that the
employer [had] established.”145
Even though the court’s reasoning is flimsy, its ultimate conclusion here is correct:
merely providing health care benefits to a designated individual does not constitute recognition
of a “union.” If the plans simply asked employees to designate a person to receive benefits, no
one could reasonably argue that they violated the prohibition contained in the marriage
amendment. Of course, this is not what the plans did – the benefits at stake could be received
only if the individual employees had “agreed” to live in relationships (or “unions”) that met the
criteria defined by the employer. In fact, given the manner in which the plans operated, the state
met the definitions of “recognize” offered by both the plaintiffs and the Attorney General: not
only did the state recognize the relationships by explicitly acknowledging their existence, it
139
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accorded them a certain amount of public significance by privileging their life choices over those
of individuals who were not in relationships. A single person could not simply designate any
individual to receive health care benefits under any of these regimes; instead, that single person
would have to be in an unmarried relationship with either a man or a woman and meet the other
requirements before designating a recipient for health insurance.
The trial court, then, reached a conclusion that could not be supported under a reasonable
interpretation of the marriage amendment. This, of course, begs, an important question: did the
court of appeals fare any better?

2.

Critique of the Court of Appeals Opinion

The logic employed by the Court of Appeals was far more straightforward than the
analysis employed by the trial court. Nevertheless, analytical problems exist in this opinion, as
well. As noted above, the Court of Appeals’ analysis began with its perceived “mandate” of the
amendment – namely, that only an agreement between a man and a woman could be recognized
as a marriage or a similar union. By conceptualizing the mandate in this way, the court was
eventually free to turn its focus to the nature of the agreement that was at stake. If the agreement
was similar to marriage, and if the state “recognized” it within the meaning of the amendment,
then the plans would have to fail. After finding that the plans “recognized” the agreements in a
formal sense of the word, the court considered whether the plans violated the similarity provision
of the amendment. Given the similarity between the eligibility requirements under the state
plans and the requirements for marriage, the court held that the amendment had been violated.146
Moreover, the recognition by the state granted “a same-sex couple the ability to hold themselves
out as a publicly recognized monogamous couple, i.e. a union.”147 The couples’ abilities to hold
themselves out as a publicly recognized union meaningfully distinguished them from people who
were simply dating – even if there were limited privileges that flowed from the decision to enter
into this public agreement, the fact that the state offered a method through which public
acknowledgement might occur manifestly created a new a status for these couples. As such,
these couples were “similar” in some sense to married people.
Even though the analysis offered by the Court of Appeals is clean and arguably
persuasive, the interpretive methodology that it used was flawed. The question of “similarity” is
far more complex than the Court of Appeals was willing to credit, and the court should have
offered a more searching rationale in support of its conclusion that the domestic partnership
agreements that were recognized by the state actually violated the amendment. “Similar” is a
word whose meaning is rather flexible: two things might be similar if they have one element in
common, if they have some elements in common, or if they have every element in common.
Rather than exploring the ambiguity that is inherent in this word, the court simply found that the
similarity between the eligibility criteria for marriage and the domestic partner plans was
sufficient to violate the amendment.
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Even though there were problems in the analytical approaches taken by both the trial
court and the court of appeals, they were essentially working in a vacuum. The marriage
amendments have not been subject to sustained critical analysis yet, so it is not clear how these
terms should be interpreted. Part III will address this problem by offering an interpretive guide
that future courts might follow if presented with similar concerns.

III.

Interpreting Critical Terms and Concepts in the Comparative Model MSAs –“Status,”
“Recognition,” and “Identical/Similar”
A.

Understanding Status and Recognition

The Comparative Model MSAs forbid the validation or recognition of any status
designation for unmarried individuals that is identical to, identical or substantially similar to, or
similar to marriage.148 Courts in these states will almost certainly have to interpret these
provisions at some point in the future, and their analyses will likely begin with a focus on the
meanings of “status” and “recognition.”149 Although these terms appear frequently in the law,
148
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they are nevertheless seldom defined, largely because their meanings are generally viewed as
understood.
Given the manner in which the term “status” is often used, it makes sense that courts and
commentators have not felt pressured to define the term standing alone. Rather frequently, the
word “status” is used in conjunction with a modifier, and this word may have greater
significance to the resolution of a dispute. By way of example, under federal law, merit system
principles governing executive branch employees grant workers a right to “fair and equitable
treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to … marital status.”150
Therefore, if an executive branch employee claimed discrimination on the basis of marital status,
the reviewing court would focus its attention on any evidence suggesting that a decision maker
had used the employee’s status as single, married, divorced, or widowed to deny him or her
certain benefits or opportunities. Since an individual might conceivably embody many different
status designations under law, it is necessary to define the status which triggers a set of legal
consequences.
Standing in isolation, then, the concept of “status” is broad and abstract. Professor Jack
Balkin has offered a more precise calibration of the term by arguing that “status” refers to those
“characteristic[s] of an individual that [have] some legal consequences.”151 He distinguishes
legal status from sociological status, noting that “lawyers usually understand legal status as a
feature of individuals and their relationships to the law . . . [while sociological status] is
concerned about social structure: [i]t is concerned with competition and hierarchy among social
collectivities.”152 Balkin’s view of status is echoed by Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines
status as “[t]he rights, duties, capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given
class.”153 Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary of Current English notes that status is “the official
classification given to someone or something.”154 Viewing these definitions in concert with each
other suggests that legal status refers to a set of characteristics that define an individual’s
membership in an official class, as a consequence of which rights, duties, capacities and/or
incapacities are acquired.
Each body of law – statutory law, common law, constitutional law, and regulatory law, as
well as judicial interpretations of these bodies of law – identifies the status designations that are
operative within it. These bodies of law contain multiple categories of classification, and
establishing the criteria for membership in those categories will result in some form of legal
to mean “sustainable and effective in law, as distinguished from that which exists or took place in fact or
appearance, but has not the requisites to enable it to be . . . enforced by law.” Id. This definition, however, would
largely duplicate the meaning of “recognition” in violation of the principle that each word in an amendment should
be construed in manner that avoids surplusage.
150
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consequence. A person who participated in Nazi persecution during World War II, for instance,
becomes a member of the category defined as “deportable;”155 in certain jurisdictions, an
entrant’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser will determine the scope of a landowner’s
duty of care toward him or her;156 if a territory acquires wetland status, certain unique
administrative duties will subsequently be imposed on the Natural Resources Conservation
Service.157 Many other examples of status designations exist throughout the law.
Acquiring a status designation, however, is simply a precondition for triggering legal
consequences; it is through the process of recognition that the consequences actually manifest.
Therefore, when evaluating the Comparative Model MSAs, one must examine “status” and
“recognition” in conjunction with each other. Much like the idea of “status,” “recognition” is a
critical term that often appears in the law, but is rarely defined. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
recognition as “[r]atification; confirmation; an acknowledgment that something done by another
person in one’s name had one’s authority.”158 Similarly, at least one federal court has found that
recognize means “to acknowledge by admitting to a privileged status.”159
The confusion generated by the meaning of the ambiguous terms used in the marriage
amendments, including term “recognize,” inspired constituents in a number of states to seek
opinions from their Attorneys General regarding the likely validity of proposed or existing plans
that offered benefits to gay and lesbian citizens.160 The Attorney General of Kentucky, for
instance, was asked to consider whether that state’s marriage amendment precluded a public
university from offering health insurance coverage to the domestic partners of its employees.161
After considering the application of “recognize” in various contexts and its analysis by different
courts, the Attorney General concluded, “whenever the government causes a benefit to depend
upon a status, the status is ‘recognized.’”162 Broadly speaking, then, “recognition” occurs when
a legal consequence flows from acquiring a status that is officially defined.
Ultimately, states that are called upon to interpret their amendments are unlikely to
encounter great difficulty when they define the concepts of “status” and “recognition.”
Moreover, they are likely to find that any analysis of the relationship between the two is equally
undemanding. Rather, interpretive problems are most likely to arise over the application of the
155
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terms to the circumstances at issue. This prediction finds support in the Ohio courts. Ohio’s
marriage amendment states as follows:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage.163
Litigation over the amendment focused on the potential conflict between the second sentence and
the application of the domestic violence statute to unmarried individuals. Unmarried defendants
could be prosecuted under the statute upon proof that they were “living as . . . spouse[s]” with
the complainant. After the passage of the marriage amendment, defendants in these cases argued
that the designation of “living as a spouse” recognized a legal status for unmarried people in
violation of the amendment.164 The lower courts in Ohio were split regarding the validity of the
claim, but the Ohio Supreme Court resolved it against the defendants in Ohio v. Carswell. This
resolution of the debate turned significantly on the court’s understanding of “status” and the
manner in which it applied to the domestic violence statute.
1.

Ohio v. Carswell: The Meaning and Application of “Status”

Since 1979, Ohio’s domestic violence laws have protected unmarried individuals who
were victimized at the hands of a cohabiting intimate partner.165 Unmarried, cohabiting partners
are protected under these laws by virtue of the manner in which “family or household member”
has been defined, both by statute and by the Ohio Supreme Court. The domestic violence statute
states as follows: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a
family or household member.”166 The statute goes on to define “family or household member” as
covering a number of different relationship categories, including “[a] person living as a
spouse.”167 This category is further defined as referring to “a person who is living or has lived
with the offender in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the
offender, or who otherwise has cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date of
the alleged commission of the act in question.”168 The domestic violence statutes do not define
“cohabitation,” but in State v. Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “the essential
elements of ‘cohabitation’ are (1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2)
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consortium. . . . Possible factors establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities might
include provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets. Factors that
might establish consortium include mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation,
solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations.”169 Carswell presented the
Ohio Supreme Court with an opportunity to consider whether the application of these principles
to an unmarried defendant in a domestic violence case “create[d] or recognize[d] a legal status
for relationships of unmarried individuals that intend[ed] to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage.”170
The Court’s substantive discussion of the issue began with its definition of the phrase
“legal status.” After examining several dictionary definitions, the Court settled on a view of
status which focused on two ideas: (1) a person’s standing before the law, and (2) the degree to
which this standing created “certain legal rights, duties, and liabilities.”171 Based on this
understanding, the Court interpreted the operative phrase of the amendment – “[t]his state . . .
shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends
to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effect of marriage” – as meaning that “the
state cannot create or recognize a legal status for unmarried persons that bears all of the
attributes of marriage – a marriage substitute.”172 This definition reflected the Court’s view of
the purpose of the amendment, which was to prevent the state from creating or recognizing a
parallel marriage regime, like civil unions.173
The Court then turned to the meaning of the “family or household” provision in the
domestic violence statute. In the Court’s view, this term did nothing more than create a class of
potential victims to whom the law offered its protection. Beyond that, the statute did not create
any new rights, privileges or benefits for individuals who were subject to the “family or
household member” provision.174 Finally, the state did not create the relationship of
cohabitation; the cohabiting couples established this state of affairs themselves.175 Since the
state played no role in creating the relationship, it could not be deemed to create or recognize any
status in violation of the amendment.176 The phrase “living as a spouse” simply “identifi[ed] a
particular class of persons for purposes of the domestic-violence statutes.”177
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2.

Critiquing the Account of Status Offered by the Carswell Court

The analysis of “status” employed by the Ohio Supreme Court was problematic for two
reasons: (1) it limited the scope of the amendment’s authority in a manner that was flatly
inconsistent with its language by holding that the only legal status prohibited by the amendment
was a marriage substitute bearing all of the attributes of marriage; and (2) by holding that the
phrase “living as a spouse” did nothing more than identify a class of victims, the Court failed to
account for the fact that everyone who was covered by the provision acquired either a set of
rights or a set of liabilities by virtue of the designation. The former objection is a straightforward
one: if the amendment drafters had intended such a narrow scope for the amendment, they could
easily have crafted a provision which prohibited the state from creating or recognizing a legal
status “for relationships of unmarried individuals that replicates the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage,” or was “equivalent to the design, qualifies, significance or
effect of marriage.” The drafters could have used any number of terms to limit the amendment
in precisely the way suggested by the Court, and yet, they did not. One might argue in response
that the intent of the framers is not the most important consideration, but rather, that the intent of
the voters should guide the Court’s analysis.178 Assuming that one could support the position,
one might further argue that all available evidence shows that the narrowing construction applied
by the Court was consistent with the voters’ understanding of the amendment. In fact, Ohio law
specifically allows courts to adduce extrinsic evidence of voter intent when interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the state constitution.179 The provision of the amendment that was
examined in Carswell is inarguably ambiguous; why, then, did the Court avoid this
methodological approach when it reached this conclusion? Obviously, there is no answer to this
question, but if the majority’s conclusion was based on a clear sense of what the voters intended,
it should have expressly said so.180
The latter objection proposed above is clearly in the minority position – only a relative
handful of the lower courts in Ohio reached this conclusion,181 and only one member of the Ohio
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Supreme Court dissented on these grounds. Nonetheless, their analyses of “status” were logical
and direct, and barring a stronger argument to the contrary, should have prevailed in the majority
opinion. As noted above, the domestic violence statute provides that, “No person shall
knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.”182
“Family or household member” is subsequently defined with reference to those persons who are
“living as . . . spouse[s];” a couple lives as spouses if they cohabit; and finally, “cohabitation” is
defined as including a variety of characteristics, among them sharing the financial
responsibilities of daily family life and consortium.183 If one follows the methodology of the
majority – namely, analyzing the language of the amendment and the language of the domestic
violence statute rather than relying on any extrinsic evidence of voter intent – it becomes
abundantly clear that applying the domestic violence statute to unmarried individuals violates the
terms of the amendment.
The Carswell Court started its substantive analysis in the right place – with a focus on the
meaning of “legal status.” Moreover, the Court’s definition of status reasonably focused on the
consequences that flowed from attaining a particular “standing,” or “position,” before the law.184
If one takes this definition seriously, it seems that a person would who acquired such “standing,”
would have to possess a very particular set of characteristics. If the person did not possess these
characteristics, no legal consequences would flow. Even the lower courts that found a violation
of the amendment offered definitions of status that were consistent with the Carswell majority’s
view. In City of Cleveland v. Voies, for instance, the Municipal Court found that “[a]ny time the
law carves out specific designations for a particular group of people to have specialized
treatment, they are, in fact, conferring a legal status on them.”185
At this point, however, the Carswell court made a significant error in its analysis: it failed
to consider adequately the consequences of falling into the category of “living as spouses.”
Couples in Ohio whose living arrangements can credibly be viewed as spouse-like in nature
attain a status under the domestic violence statute because proof of the designation carries rights
and liabilities. An abusive partner is not merely subject to criminal liability under the assault
statute; this person is also subject to the distinct penalties and restraints that flow from violating
2006 WL 925179 (Ohio Ct. App. April 7, 2006), at *1 (same); State v. Shaffer, 2006 WL 1459769 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 30, 2006), at **2-3 (same); State v. Logsdon, 2006 WL 1585447 (Ohio Ct. App. June 12, 2006), at **5-6
(same); State v. McKinney, 2007 WL 437839 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2007), at *4 (same); cf. State v. Peterson,
2005 WL 1940114 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas April 18, 2005), at *2 (holding that the application of the domestic
violence statute to unmarried individuals violates the marriage amendment without offering any analysis of “status”
or “recognition”).
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the domestic violence statute: “[s]pecial bail considerations, enhancement of penalties[,] and
civil protection orders would no longer be available to cohabiting couples if the domestic
violence statutes [were] determined to be unconstitutional as applied.”186 This argument was
proposed by organizations that work with victims of domestic violence, and ironically, it proves
the point: but for the law’s designation of these couples as falling into the category of “living as
spouses,” a defendant who engaged in domestic violence would be subject to the penalties for
criminal assault, and nothing more. The additional penalties provided under the domestic
violence statute simply would not apply. Ultimately, one might argue that the domestic violence
statute has created a special duty to refrain from assaulting a cohabiting partner by premising
unique liabilities on the fact of the relationship.
If one views the statute from the perspective of the complainants, the individuals whose
relationships with the defendants meet the relevant characteristics of those who “live as spouses”
acquire certain rights under the domestic violence statute. As an initial matter, attainment of this
status grants both cohabiting partners the right to file charges against the other under the
domestic violence statute.187 Moreover, the statute grants unmarried complainants who are
living as spouses a right to seek temporary protection orders from a court upon filing a
complaint.188 Additionally, if a police officer believes that an act of domestic violence has
occurred between a couple that he or she reasonably believes is living as spouses, the putative
defendant can be arrested in the absence of a warrant.189 An unmarried complainant, therefore,
has a right to insist that such a detention take place.
Thus, the Court erred when it held that the statute merely created a category of victims,
and did not create any new status category. The Court also erred when it held that no official
recognition of the status occurred when prosecutors applied the domestic violence statute to
individuals who fell into the contested category. The domestic violence statute creates a
framework within which unmarried individuals who are living as spouses have a special right to
expect non-violence in their relationships, a right that is supported by the enhanced penalties that
are imposed and the protections that are granted if that right is violated. As such, the Court
should have found that the domestic violence statute created a legal status that was recognized by
prosecutors when they charged unmarried defendants under its provisions.
B.

Status, Recognition, and the Application of These Terms to Public Employers’
Domestic Partner Benefits Plans
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The foregoing analysis of status begs an important question: does it translate into the
employee benefits context? Employees receive benefits from their employers, not as a matter of
statute, but rather, as a matter of contract. Moreover, eligibility for the benefits is based on
criteria that are developed by the employer and differ from one employer to the next; they are not
uniform, and they are not imposed by statute. Does the fact that these benefits are dispensed by
contract alter the analysis of status that has been proposed thus far? In other words, would a
public employer in a Comparative Model MSA state violate the prohibition against recognizing a
status if the purported status is nothing more than a collection of eligibility requirements?
Status designations are not recognized only under formal legal circumstances, as when a
judicial decision or a statute establishes the criteria that a particular individual must meet.
Domestic partner benefit plans are actually a perfect example of how a status can be both
conferred and recognized through the process of entering a contract. Of course, some
commentators would argue to the contrary. They would maintain that these plans simply
establish criteria that qualify a person to receive a benefit, and that no corresponding status has
been recognized because the benefit is simply a byproduct of the employment relationship.190
This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it fails to appreciate one critical factor: when the
employee meets the criteria established under the contract (i.e., meets those characteristics that
place him or her in a particular class), he or she not only acquires the benefits, but also acquires a
corresponding right of enforcement if the employer fails to produce those benefits. One
commentator has described domestic partner benefits plans in similar terms:
Recognition of the partnership and the corresponding status of “domestic partner”
in business and government contexts [are] typically achieved upon conformity
with certain definitional guidelines. As with any non-standard regulation, specific
criteria defining the elements of a domestic partnership will vary from entity to
entity. However, most definitions of domestic partnerships contain at least
several common elements, including: (1) minimum time requirements that
establish a committed relationship; (2) evidence of financial interdependence; (3)
sharing a joint residence; (4) certain parameters of the relationship, such as
exclusivity, no close blood relationship, and no current legal partner; and (5)
naming the partner as a beneficiary of [a] life insurance [policy] or pension plan.
These requirements are not the product of government regulation or subject to
oversight, and therefore will surely continue to be modified as domestic partner
status becomes more common.191
Thus, a status is acquired upon meeting those requirements that are based on an evaluation of the
employee’s intimate relationship with his or her partner, and recognition follows upon achieving
that status.
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Applying “status” and “recognition” to a hypothetical example will serve to illustrate the
manner in which these terms work. John and Jason are males in their early-30s who have been
involved in an exclusive, intimate relationship for more than two years. They have been living
together for the past eighteen months and it is their intention to continue living together
indefinitely. There is no blood relationship between them, and neither one has ever been married
or in a registered domestic partnership with any other individual. They have not married each
other or been joined in a civil union because they live in a Comparative Model MSA state which
forbids the establishment of such arrangements. Nonetheless, prior to the passage of the
amendment in their state, they signed an affidavit at City Hall which registered them as domestic
partners under the local domestic partner registry.192 Finally, their economic lives are fully
intertwined with the other: John is an assistant professor of Political Science at the local public
university, Jason is a violinist in the local symphony orchestra, and they use their combined
income to pay for all of their personal and household expenses.
In an effort to minimize the discrimination experienced by its gay and lesbian employees
and increase its ability to recruit talented individuals, the Human Resources Office at John’s
school has decided that it wants to implement a partner benefits program. This program would
extend health insurance coverage to the domestic partners of its gay and lesbian employees. In
order to qualify for coverage under the program, employees and their partners must meet the
following criteria:
(1) the parties must be at least 18 years old;
(2) the parties must share a close, personal relationship with each other and must be
jointly responsible for basic living expenses, including the cost of food, shelter, and
the common expenses of maintaining a household;
(3) the parties must not currently have a similar relationship with any other person, and
they must not have had a similar relationship (including marriage) with any other
person within the past twelve months;
(4) the parties may not be a member of the other’s immediate family, defined as a spouse,
child, parent, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or cousin within the
second degree;
(5) the parties must be of the same gender
(6) the parties must have shared the same regular and permanent residence for at least the
past six months, and must intend to do so for the indefinite future;
(7) the parties must be registered in the city as domestic partners.
In this case, the local orchestra does not offer health insurance coverage, so John would like to
cover Jason under his policy (currently, Jason does not have any other health insurance of his
own). Based on the foregoing, Jason obviously qualifies for coverage under the proposed partner
benefits program. If the program is implemented and he actually receives those benefits, can one
argue that this public school – an entity of the state – has recognized a status for the couple in
violation of the terms of the state’s marriage amendment?
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The answer here has to be “yes.” Once it is established that John and Jason meet the
criteria laid out by the school, they fall into the official classification of “eligible individual.”
Moreover, the status of eligibility has been defined entirely with reference to the nature of the
intimate relationship between them. If Jason was simply John’s roommate, or if he was in the
middle of divorce proceedings with his soon-to-be ex-wife, or if they had not registered as
domestic partners with the city, Jason would not fall into the class of individuals who are eligible
for coverage under the policy. Even though the status designation has not been created by
judicial action or set forth in a statute, the characteristics for acquiring the status nonetheless
have been set by an arm of the state. Furthermore, Jason’s acquisition of the status which arose
after meeting the eligibility criteria triggers the state employer’s contractual promise to cover
him under its health insurance program. As such, Jason’s status has been recognized by the
public employer. A legal consequence has flowed from the official recognition of his eligible
status – if the employer does not provide the benefits, John will have an action against his
employer for breach of contract.
Of course, finding that an official status has been recognized by the state is only the first
part of any analysis under the Comparative Model MSAs. The next step is to examine whether
the status recognized by the state is sufficiently similar to marriage to fall within the scope of
prohibition laid out by the amendment. The next section will consider this question in greater
detail.
C.

Understanding “Identical/Similar”

While it is important for courts to resolve correctly the questions surrounding the
meaning and application of “recognition” and “status,” challenges to these employee benefits
plans will succeed or fail based on the degree of marital similarity that is prohibited by the
amendment in question. Among the Comparative Model MSAs, one state – Alabama – prohibits
the recognition of a parallel union that is identical to marriage: “A union replicating marriage of
or between persons of the same sex . . . shall be considered and treated in all respects as having
no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or
other union replicating marriage.”193 Six states – Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota,
Utah, and Wisconsin – prohibit the recognition of parallel institutions that are identical or
substantially similar to marriage.194 The remaining eight states – Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia – have amendments whose language
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The relevant portions of these amendments state as follows: Arkansas: “Legal status for unmarried persons
which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas. . . .”;
Kentucky: “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not
be valid or recognized.”; Louisiana: “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”; North Dakota: “No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”; Texas:
“This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to
marriage.”; Utah: “No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the
same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”; Wisconsin: “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that
of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state.” See Appendix 1.
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suggests that mere similarity between a recognized status and marriage will be invalid.195 How
should courts analyze these provisions?
As noted above, Alabama is the only Comparative Model MSA state that precludes
recognition of a status for unmarried couples that “replicates” marriage. A replica, of course, is
an identical copy of some other entity; it is “an exact copy or model of something.”196 Applying
this definition to the amendment, it is immediately clear that the only status designation covering
a gay or lesbian relationship that is prohibited by the amendment is one that is identical to
marriage. The language of the amendment, then, is so narrow and precise that it would cover
only a marriage substitute that mimics marriage along every axis. As a technical matter, then,
even a Vermont-style civil union regime or a California-style domestic partnership regime would
be legal under the terms of the Alabama amendment! Even though both regimes grant gay and
lesbian couples rights that are equivalent to marriage under state law, they do not replicate
marriage for one primary reason: the Defense of Marriage Act ensures that these couples do not
have the same rights as married heterosexual couples under federal law, thus creating a highly
significant difference between marriage and civil union-like relationships.197 Currently, there are
no same-sex relationships that perfectly replicate marriage from the formal standpoint of legal
equality.198 Therefore, if a public employer in Alabama chose to grant employee benefits to its
195
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gay and lesbian employees based on any of the criteria in the plans at stake in National Pride at
Work, the amendment would not invalidate these plans. None of the plans create or recognize a
status that replicates marriage, so the state has retained significant discretionary authority in this
instance to offer benefits to its gay and lesbian citizens.
The next category of amendments – those which preclude the creation or recognition of
status categories for unmarried couples that are identical or substantially similar to marriage –
begs the question, “What is substantially similar to marriage?”199 The Alabama analysis
explains how courts should understand the word “replicates,” or in this case, “identical,” but the
understanding of “substantially similar” is less clear. Again looking to the dictionary,
“substantially” means “to a great or significant extent; for the most part; essentially.”200 The lack
of clarity, however, arises when considering the meaning of the word “similar,” and this lack of
clarity plagues the third category of amendments, as well.201 Insofar as dictionary definitions are
concerned, “similar” means “like something but not exactly the same,”202 but this definition is
not terribly helpful. Is a domestic partner relationship “similar” to marriage if most of its
attributes are held in common with marriage? Is it similar if some of its attributes are held in
common with marriage? What if it has only one attribute in common with marriage – is it still
similar in some relevant respect to marriage?
The dictionary definition of “similar” clearly does not address the matter in adequate
fashion. A better source for defining “similar” is a group of cases which considered whether
domestic partner registries and/or domestic partner benefits regimes established by state or local
laws were sufficiently similar to marriage to violate state prohibitions on permitting same-sex
marriage.203 In Knight v. Superior Court,204 Devlin v. City of Philadelphia,205 and Slattery v.
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
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City of New York,206 the courts offered detailed analyses of those questions. In doing so, they
described civil marriage207 as comprised of two constitutive elements: (1) a status component,
and (2) a rights/benefits component. The status component was acquired by meeting the entry
requirements established by statute, and then formalizing the union in a state-sanctioned
ceremony. The rights and benefits of civil marriage, on the other hand, were simply the “bundle
of sticks” that a couple received after acquiring marital status.208 Examining those cases will
highlight some of the primary considerations that the Comparative Model MSA states should
keep in mind when they are trying to evaluate this question of similarity.
1.

Knight v. Superior Court

Considerations of marital status, domestic partner status, and the comparison between the
two are critical to the analysis in these cases, and Knight v. Superior Court does a masterful job
of illustrating this point. In Knight, the California Supreme Court considered whether the
legislature violated the state’s Defense of Marriage Act (“Act” or “baby DOMA”209) when it
passed new legislation granting “[r]egistered domestic partners . . . the same rights, protections, .
. . benefits, . . . responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . . as are granted to and
imposed upon spouses.”210 California’s baby DOMA states as follows: “Only marriage between
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”211 Plaintiffs used this language in
support of their claim that the Act was meant to accomplish two goals: (1) prevent the
recognition of same-sex marriage, and (2) exclusively reserve for married couples the rights and
privileges associated with the institution.212 By extending those rights and privileges to
unmarried couples, plaintiffs claimed that the domestic partnership statute effectively amended
the Act.213 Since the Act was the subject of an initiative petition that was approved by the voters,
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any amendments would also have to be approved by the voters.214 The domestic partner statute
had not been subject to popular approval; as such, plaintiffs claimed that it was invalid.215
The Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ analysis. As an initial matter, the Court held
that the plain language of the Act was “concerned only with who is entitled to obtain the status
of marriage, and not with the rights and obligations associated with marriage.”216 It was true that
the legislature could not unilaterally alter the definition of marriage as the union of one man and
one woman; it was also true that the legislature had not done so when it passed the domestic
partnership legislation. The Court’s evaluation of the plain language of the Act did not end here.
It also looked at more broadly-constructed same-sex marriage prohibitions that were passed
around the nation and found that many of them explicitly stated that no unmarried couples would
be entitled to the benefits and privileges of marriage. 217 This evidence suggested that if the
drafters of California’s baby DOMA had intended to restrict the legislature’s ability to grant the
rights and benefits of marriage to unmarried couples, they could have followed the models
employed by these states. Instead, they offered voters a more narrowly-constructed proposal
whose language merely imposed a gender requirement on marriage. In addition, the Court found
that the objective intent underlying the Act supported this position. After looking at the ballot
materials that accompanied its passage, the Court held:
[The Act] was intended solely to preserve the status of marriage in California for persons
of the opposite sex by preventing the recognition of marriages from other jurisdictions if
those marriages are between homosexuals. No mention [was] made of an intent to limit
the rights and obligations of domestic partnerships, civil unions, or any other kind of
same-sex relationship regardless of its characterization. If this were the actual intent of
the proponents of [the Act], the electorate was not given the opportunity to vote on that
undisclosed objective.218
It was clear to the voters that the sole purpose of the Act was to implement a gender-based
gatekeeping requirement that would reserve marital status for opposite-sex couples. No other
considerations were on the table at the time.
Viewed in conjunction with the other gatekeeping requirements for marriage under
California law, it was apparent that domestic partner status was not equivalent to marital status.
First of all, couples who wished to marry had to acquire a license.219 Couples who wished to
become domestic partners, on the other hand, merely had to file a Declaration of Domestic
Partnership which specified their intent to form or continue a committed relationship.220 Second,
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married couples who wished to divorce had to undergo proceedings that were overseen by a
court. 221 The rules for terminating a domestic partnership, however, were quite different.
Domestic partners who had no children, had been together less than five years, and who met
particular conditions that bore on property and debt could terminate the partnership simply by
filing a Notice of Termination with the Secretary of State.222 Ultimately, the comparison
between marital status and domestic partner status revealed that the two were insufficiently
similar to support plaintiffs’ claim.
The Court’s analysis, however, did not end with its consideration of status. It also looked
at the rights and benefits granted to civil marriage, and once again, found that between marriage
and domestic partnerships were not equivalent. Taking a close look at the function of the rights
and benefits attached to marriage, the Court concluded that, “The policy favoring marriage is
‘rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.’”223 The rights and responsibilities
that flowed from marriage had a distinctly instrumental purpose – they were a crucial aspect of
ensuring social stability. Therefore, the legislature made a reasonable policy choice when it
expanded the rights associated with domestic partnership, precisely because gays and lesbians
were creating family structures that implicated the same societal concerns raised by married
couples. Since the law prevented gay and lesbian couples from getting married, the state needed
another mechanism for regulating their relationships; the expanded rights and responsibilities
offered by the domestic partner statute allowed the state to do this.224 Nevertheless, this wideranging expansion of domestic partner rights and responsibilities was still not equivalent to the
rights and responsibilities of married couples:
[D]omestic partners do not receive a number of marital rights and benefits. For
example, they may not file joint tax returns and their earned income is not treated
as community property for state income tax purposes, and they are not entitled to
numerous benefits provided to married couples by the federal government, such
as marital benefits relating to Social Security, Medicare, federal housing, food
stamps, veterans’ benefits, military benefits, an federal employment benefit
laws.225
In light of this conclusion, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ request to invalidate the domestic
partner statute should be denied. Knight, then, is particularly instructive when trying to
determine whether domestic partner status is sufficiently similar to marriage to violate a
Comparative Model MSA amendment. Even though the issue in Knight considered whether the
statute in question rendered domestic partnerships equivalent to marriage, the California
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Supreme Court identified the vast differences that exist between marriage and domestic
partnerships, even when the state has gone as far as it possibly can to render the two equivalent.
A case like Knight will surely assist other courts around the country when they try to decide
whether the domestic partner status designations recognized by public employer benefits plans
are sufficiently similar to marriage to constitute a violation of their respective amendments.
2.

Devlin v. City of Philadelphia

Devlin v. City of Philadelphia presented a set of factual circumstances that were
measurably different from those at stake in the Knight case, but the analysis employed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also focused on the purported identity between a domestic partner
relationship and marriage.226 The statute at issue in Devlin was different from the one examined
in Knight – the domestic partner statute in Knight was akin to the civil union statutes of states
like New Jersey and Vermont, while the statute in Devlin was structured like the typical domestic
partner statutes found in localities around the country.227 In Devlin, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the status created by this kind of domestic partner statute was highly distinct from
the status created by the marriage laws.
The controversy in Devlin began when the Philadelphia City Council passed two bills,
one of which amended the definition of “marital status” to include the status of being a “Life
Partner,” and the other one of which required employers in the city who were not covered by
ERISA to treat Life Partners as dependents who were eligible for employee benefits.228 After the
City Council Passed the amendment to the city code, “marital status” was redefined to include
“the status of being single, married, separated, divorced, widowed, or a life partner.”229 The
plaintiffs argued that these statutes infringed on the state’s exclusive authority to regulate
marriage because they effectively treated same-sex couples as married, but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court disagreed.230
As an initial matter, including “life partner” in the definitional category of “marital
status” did not result in any equation between “life partner” and “married.” Rather, the Court
found that “the reference to ‘the status of being . . . a life partner’ . . . merely supplement[ed] the
terms ‘single,’ ‘divorced’ and ‘widowed’ as yet another unmarried ‘marital status.’”231 In
addition, the Court noted that the myriad rights and responsibilities attendant upon marriage did
not follow from achieving life partner status. Life partners did not acquire the same rights that
226
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married couples received in the areas of divorce, alimony, child support, child custody, and
equitable distribution, among others.232 The rights and benefits that life partners acquired
“[were] but a small fraction of what marriage affords its participants.”233 Finally, the Court
found that the decision to provide employee benefits to life partners affected nothing more than
“’the personnel and administration of the offices local to Philadelphia.’”234 As such, the Court
could not reasonably conclude that the Philadelphia City Council had approved a marital
equivalent in violation of state law.
3.

Slattery v. City of New York

Last, in Slattery v. City of New York, the plaintiffs argued that city officials had infringed
on the state’s exclusive authority to regulate in the area of marriage and domestic relations by
passing the domestic partner statute. 235 Like the Supreme Courts of California and
Pennsylvania, the court in Slattery rejected this claim. First of all, the court noted that the
criteria necessary for acquiring domestic partner status were different from those that were
necessary for establishing marital status. According to the local ordinance, a couple could
register as domestic partners if their relationship met the following requirements: (1) both were
New York City residents, or at least one was employed by the city; (2) both individuals were at
least eighteen years old; (3) neither individual was married to someone else; (4) neither
individuals was a registered member of another domestic partnership; (5) at least six months had
to have passed since the termination of any other domestic partnership of which either or both
individuals had been a part; (6) neither individual was related to each other in a manner that
would prevent them from getting married under state law; and (7) the partners lived together and
shared a close, intimate, personal relationship.236 Once these characteristics were met, a couple
could become domestic partners simply by signing an affidavit.237 These requirements differed
substantially from those that were necessary for marriage under New York law. Couples that
wished to marry had to acquire a license, meet several health and blood testing requirements, and
have the relationship solemnized by a state-approved officiant.238
The court also compared the benefits available to married couples and domestic partners,
and used this distinction as another basis upon which the court distinguished marriage from
domestic partnerships. Married couples received rights, benefits, duties and obligations that
simply did not follow from achieving domestic partner status. Among the many privileges and
obligations associated with marriage, the court specifically noted that married couples were able
to legitimize their children; they enjoyed financial rights in their spouse’s properties; they had
232
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rights that bore on the dispensation of estate assets after the death of a spouse; and they received
various protections after the termination of a marriage.239 Domestic partners, on the other hand,
did not receive these benefits and were not subject to these obligations. Instead, registration
merely ensured the following: city employees who were in domestic partner relationships would
be entitled to bereavement and child care leaves of absence, as well as certain health and
retirement benefits; all domestic partners would have visitation rights in correctional facilities
and health facilities operated by the city; and finally, all domestic partners living in buildings
operated by the city or under the jurisdiction of the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development would be characterized as “family members” for the purpose of determining
succession or occupancy rights.240 All told, the rights and benefits that gays and lesbians
acquired after registering as domestic partners did not begin to approximate those that
heterosexual couples realized after getting married. Therefore, it was not plausible to suggest
that the city had created marriage by another name when it implemented the domestic
partnership statute.
D.

Variable Prohibitions on Degrees of Similarity Between Domestic Partnerships
and Marriage, and the Corresponding Impact on Partner Benefits Plans

The example of John and Jason will help a court determine whether the status recognized
by John’s employer falls within the scope of the prohibition established by the particular
amendment in question. In order to see whether the plan proposed by John’s employer passes
muster, the hypothetical must be evaluated under the three types of MSAs presented here: those
that prohibit the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, those that prohibit the
recognition of a status that is substantially similar to marriage, and those that prohibit the
recognition of a status that is similar to marriage.
1. “Identical to” Criterion
In a state that prohibits the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, Jason
should be covered under the partner benefits policy. As discussed above, the “identical to”
language sets a high threshold that is difficult to meet, and would not be met in this case. Knight,
Devlin, Slattery, and similar cases are directly on point here: When evaluating whether a status
conferred by a partner benefits plan is equivalent to marriage, a court would have to consider the
most important institutional aspects of marriage. From the standpoint of the civil law, the most
important institutional factors embodied in marriage are its status designation and the rights and
benefits that flow from that status. Just as the analyses in those cases concluded that the
domestic partner designations at stake were not the equivalent of marriage, the same conclusion
is true here. The status recognized by John’s employer does not come close to marriage.
Couples who wish to marry need not show that they are already financially interdependent; they
need not prove that their relationship is an exclusive one; recently-divorced individuals are not
subject to a waiting period before marrying another person; and finally, the parties need not live
together. It is true that in a Comparative Model MSA state, there is a gender requirement for
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marriage that parallels the gender requirement in the partner benefits plan, and there are blood
relationship requirements that a couple must also meet, but on balance, the two statuses simply
are not equivalent.
The lack of identity between John and Jason’s relationship and marriage becomes
increasingly stark when one compares the benefit that they receive after acquiring a status under
the employment contract, and the benefits that couples receive when they acquire marital status.
Jason will receive one benefit – coverage under John’s health insurance policy – that arises from
his eligible status. Receiving this one benefit cannot reasonably sustain a claim of equivalence.
First of all, health insurance is not a “benefit” of marriage; it is a fringe benefit of employment
whose provision depends on the terms of the employment agreement, not the marital status of the
employee. This is demonstrated by the fact that many employers do not offer any health care
benefits to their employees at all.241 Second, even if health insurance was a benefit of marriage,
it is the only benefit that Jason would receive, as compared to the thousands of benefits that
married couples receive under state and federal law. No reasonable judge could find that the
program in question here is identical to marriage. Therefore, if John and Jason live in a state that
prohibits the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, the benefits program will be
sustained.
2. “Substantially Similar to” Criterion
In a state that prohibits the recognition of a status that is “substantially similar” to
marriage, Jason should still receive coverage under the partner benefits policy. The analysis
above explains how he will prevail under an “identical” analysis; the question now is how he will
prevail under the “substantially similar” analysis. As noted above, “substantially” means “to a
great or significant extent; for the most part; essentially.”242 “Similar” means “like something
but not exactly the same.”243 If these definitions are blended, one may conclude that the phrase
“substantially similar” means “essentially the same as something, but not exactly like that
something.” How, exactly, does one determine whether one item embodies the essence of yet
another item? One plausible solution is to show that the most important characteristics of the
former item are present in the latter. Substantial similarity would therefore exist between two
items if the most important characteristics of each were held almost entirely in common between
the two.
The relevant comparison, of course, is between domestic partnerships and marriage: are
the two regimes essentially equivalent, even if they are not exactly the same? The Knight,
Devlin, and Slattery courts offer some assistance here, as well, since the analyses in those cases
turned on the core features of civil marriage – status and benefits. If a court accepts that these
elements are, in fact, the core of civil marriage, domestic partnerships are essentially equivalent
if they mirror civil marriage along these two dimensions. As noted above, however, this degree
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of similarity simply does not exist. 244 First of all, the entry and exit requirements are different in
marriage and domestic partnerships. People who want to marry each other have to acquire
licenses; people who wish to become domestic partners merely indicate their assent to the
relationship. In addition, married people who wish to exit the relationship must receive a
judicially-reviewed divorce; domestic partners merely need to indicate their desire to terminate
the relationship. Moreover, the benefits that flow from marriage vastly outnumber the benefits
that flow from membership in a domestic partnership. It is true that there are some features in
common. Often times, both marriage and domestic partnership arrangements have gender
requirements. Similarly, they both tend to have blood relationship requirements. Finally, both
have anti-“polyunion” requirements. These similarities notwithstanding, they simply do not rise
to the level of substantial similarity.
Looking, then, at John and Jason, the status conferred by the employment policy and the
benefits received under it are not substantially similar to the essential elements of marriage.
Even if there are admitted similarities that exist between the domestic partner relationship
recognized by the policy and marriage, it is unquestionably true that most of the factors that bear
on their status differ substantially from the factors that bear on marital status, and further, that the
benefit they receive pales in comparison to the benefits they could receive if they were married.
Therefore, John and Jason should prevail in a Comparative Model MSA state that adopts the
“substantially similar” limitation on state recognition of unmarried relationships.
3.

“Similar to” Criterion

The analysis becomes substantially more difficult when considering whether the status
recognized by the employment policy is similar to marriage. Two things that are compared to
each other are technically “similar” if they share every element in common; conversely, they are
arguably “similar” if they share one aspect in common. As discussed, the eligibility criteria in
the John/Jason example are potentially similar to the eligibility criteria for marriage, and
depending on the analysis employed by the state courts, this might be sufficient to invalidate the
policy. Having said that, the term “similarity,” standing alone, is an ambiguous one that does not
convey any limiting principle on which a court might rest its analysis. Therefore, what
principled interpretive choices can a court make when trying to decide whether a partner benefits
program like the one proposed for John and Jason violates the similarity prohibition of the
amendment?
The answer to this question is frankly unclear, and will almost certainly be the subject of
fierce litigation when the question presents itself. One possible source of a resolution, however,
comes from the evidence of the debates that surrounded the passage of these amendments. This
evidence might help a reviewing court decide whether the voters believed that the dispensation
by public entities of domestic partner benefits policies would violate the amendment. Reliance
244
Brodie M. Butland, The Categorical Imperative: Romer as the Groundwork for Challenge State Defense of
Marriage Amendments, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1419, 1431 (2007) (“It is questionable whether domestic partnerships are
truly “similar to marriage,” never mind “substantially similar to . . . marriage,” because of their limited reach. While
previous courts and commentators have cited a veritable laundry list of state benefits and protections that
accompany marriage, domestic partnerships and reciprocal beneficiaries have enjoyed only a limited number of
these.”); see also Mark Strasser, Some Observations about DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363, 379 (2002) (noting that some domestic partnership arrangements are
symbolic, while others offer a strikingly limited set of material benefits).

46

on evidence of voter intent is not a revolutionary proposition; state law rules of constitutional
interpretation regularly direct courts to engage in just this kind of analysis. In fact, these rules
commonly state that in the presence of linguistic ambiguity, courts must consider the intent of
the voters when interpreting their constitutions.245 Given the ambiguity that exists in this case, a
close examination of voter intent is appropriate. In order to examine comprehensively the intent
of the voters when passing the amendments, the following analysis will not simply focus on
those states whose amendments prohibited mere similarity between marriage and other
proscribed statuses; it will look at all of the Comparative Model MSA regimes because most of
them were passed relatively contemporaneously, between 2004 and 2005.

a.

Evaluating the Voters’ Intent to Undermine Public Employers’
Rights to Offer Partner Benefits to Their Same-Sex Employees

Ascertaining the legislative intent behind a statute can be notoriously difficult for anyone
who engages in the process of statutory construction. If an objective intent cannot be divined
from the face of the statute, questions will arise about the sources of authority from which the
interpreter will draw when addressing the issue. Are floor debates a legitimate source of
authority for determining the intent behind a bill? Are statements from bill sponsors legitimate
sources? Committee reports? Explanations from floor managers?246 Moreover, how does one
address the problem of competing intentions among legislators, or strategic intentions that are
distinct from the subject matter of the bill?247 Courts and commentators have debated these
questions for years, and those debates will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future.
As difficult as it is to determine the intention of a legislative body when it passes a
statute, determining the intent of voters who approve a statewide measure, such as an amendment
to the state constitution, is necessarily even less precise. The most reasonable approach to
finding this intent is to rely on public sources which were widely available during the period in
time when the measure was passed:
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“Constitutional provisions and statutory enactments should be read and construed
in light of the condition of affairs and circumstances existing at the time of their
adoption” and “against which its provisions were directed, and in doing so the
court will look to the public history of such time as the same can be gathered from
the press, public writings, and the current literature of that time.”248
Sources such as contemporaneous newspaper reports and editorials, transcripts from or
recordings of broadcast public debates, any available reports from constitutional conventions or
other deliberative bodies, books or pamphlets discussing the measure, and explanatory
statements accompanying the ballot are legitimate avenues for extrapolating the intent of the
voters. While none of these resources will offer a definitive account of what the voters meant to
accomplish when they passed the measure, they at least offer a reasonable assurance that a
number of voters encountered them and may have been influenced by them.
Insofar as the marriage amendments are concerned, it is not clear whether voters in the
Comparative Model MSA states intended to strip public entities of their authority to offer
domestic partner benefits. As an initial matter, there is copious evidence which suggests that,
even if a number of voters did not subjectively intend that result, they reasonably should have
known that the proposed language was sufficiently broad to encompass the possibility. First of
all, leading proponents of the amendments in several states were upfront about their desire to
achieve this precise goal. In Ohio, for instance, an official explanation of the marriage
amendment which accompanied the ballot contained statements that supported and opposed the
measure.249 One of the statements in support of the measure stated as follows: “[The proposed
marriage amendment] restricts governmental bodies in Ohio from using your tax dollars to give
official status, recognition and benefits to homosexual and other deviant relationships that seek
to imitate marriage.”250 This statement was submitted by the Ohio Campaign to Protect
Marriage, which proposed the initiative petition that resulted in the amendment.
Various supporters of the failed Arizona amendment251 were equally direct about the
impact of the amendment. The explanation which accompanied the Arizona ballot contained
numerous statements of support for the amendment, two of which were provided by the Center
for Arizona Policy, Inc. and the activist group, Protect Marriage Arizona. The Center for
Arizona Policy disputed the “myth” that “[p]rivate contracts [would] be voided” by responding
that “[t]he amendment only applie[d] to the government[,] . . . . [and] ha[d] nothing to do with
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private agreements.” 252 The statement from Protect Marriage Arizona was actually prepared by
business leaders in the state who argued:
[T]his measure will not affect the ability of private businesses to choose what
benefits to grant their employees. The amendment clearly applies only to public
employers in the state of Arizona, for it states that no marriage substitutes can be
recognized by the “state or its political subdivisions.” Private businesses clearly
do not fall in this category.253
Arizona voters actually did heed these warnings. Heterosexual voters – in particular, senior
citizens – understood exactly how the amendment might undermine their lives: “Arizona voters
narrowly rejected their amendment, due in part to the sizeable percentage of savvy cohabiting
seniors who realized it could be used to jeopardize their rights as domestic partners to, for
example, visit each other in the hospital or make medical decisions.”254 Opponents of the
measure ran a campaign that appealed to numerous constituencies – including same-sex couples,
seniors, domestic violence survivors, unmarried heterosexual couples, and the business
community – and in doing so, persuaded them that voting against the amendment was
fundamentally in their own interest.255
Michigan provides another example where amendment backers expressly stated their
desire to prevent public employers from offering domestic partner benefits. One of the primary
supporters of the Michigan marriage amendment was Gary Glenn, president of the American
Family Association of Michigan. On various occasions, media outlets reported Glenn’s
interpretation of the amendment, which he believed would prevent public employers from
offering domestic partner benefits: “'Under [the amendment], every single person currently
receiving any kind of benefit would continue to do so. But it would not be on the basis of a
government employer singling out homosexual relationships for the special treatment of being
recognized as equal or similar to marriage.’”256 Similarly, the Michigan Family Forum, another
leading supporter of the amendment, created a “Frequently Asked Questions” page on its website
which addressed some of the major issues that were being debated during the election.257 The
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page posed the following question: “Will public universities be prohibited from providing
benefits to partners of employees?”258 The Forum provided this answer:
Legal experts disagree on how much this may restrict public universities. The
Michigan Constitution grants universities significant autonomy to govern
themselves through their elected Boards. It is reasonable to assume that state
funds will be prohibited from from [sic] going to same-sex partner benefits while
other funding sources, such as tuition, fees or donations, will be allowed to pay
for same-sex partner benefits.259
The answer to the question provided here was an honest, straightforward effort to educate the
voter. Universities, however, were not the only public entities about whom the Michigan Family
Forum offered an opinion. Another question asked, “Will unions or businesses be prohibited
from negotiating contracts that offer benefits to same-sex partners of employees?”260 Once
again, the Forum provided a direct, straightforward response: “The state of Michigan will be
prohibited from providing benefits to same-sex partners of state employees if those benefits are
provided based on marital status, as most are.”261 Even if one assumes that only a small
percentage of voters visited the Michigan Family Forum website, other proponents made a
number of statements that were issued to the public in widespread fashion. In fact, one poll
taken prior to the election showed that 54 percent of voters believed that “’local governments
and universities should not provide benefits, such as health and life insurance, to the partners of
gay and lesbian employees.’”262 It is quite reasonable, then, to believe that Michigan voters were
aware of the probable impact of the amendment on domestic partner benefits offered by public
employers.263
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Proponents of the amendments, however, were not the only parties offering these
assessments. All across the country, opponents were busy sounding the alarm. They made a
sustained effort to educate the public about the likely impact of the amendments under
consideration in their states, and it does not stretch credulity to believe that voters must have
encountered these statements at some point in time. The ballot explanation in Arizona, for
instance, gave opponents a final opportunity to make their case before the voters, and they used it
to express the fear that the amendment would hamper public employers’ abilities to offer partner
benefits.264 Similarly, the non-partisan Citizens Research Council of Michigan noted that the
Coalition for a Fair Michigan, a fierce opponent of the measure, claimed that “passage would
eliminate existing domestic partner benefits that are provided by state universities and some
other government employers, which give health care and other benefits to the unmarried partners
of employees.”265 In South Dakota, the opponents did not make explicit reference to public
employers and partner benefits, but they argued against the amendment by focusing on the
impact that similar amendments in other states had on governmental functions:
Voting NO doesn’t make gay marriage legal. Voting NO keeps South Dakota the
way it is right now.266 Voting NO tells legislators that we care about these issues,
but not at the risk of creating unintended consequences.
Voting yes had the unintended consequence of taking away health care for many
unmarried families in Michigan.
Voting yes had the unintended consequence of removing domestic violence
protections for unmarried straight couples in Ohio. Changing the Constitution
tied judges’ hands and forced them to let abusers go free.
Many senior couples don’t remarry for risk of losing Social Security and pension
benefits. Voting yes may remove their ability to make medical decisions for each
other.
Obviously, these statements were not persuasive to South Dakota’s voters, but they certainly
gave the voters full information when weighing the potential consequences of a “yes” vote.267
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Finally, a number of objective assessments reached identical conclusions about the
potential impact of the amendments. The non-partisan Citizens Research Council of Michigan,
for instance, concluded that the “[l]ong term implications of passage are open to interpretation
and range from simply strengthening existing state law that prohibits same-sex marriages to
reversing the legality of domestic partner benefits, same-sex or otherwise, offered by public and
private employers.”268 The Idaho Secretary of State also weighed into the debate when he
assessed the amendment that accompanied the ballot: “The language [would] prohibit[] the state
and its political subdivisions from granting any or all of the legal benefits of marriage to civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or any other relationship that attempts to approximate
marriage.”269 Virginia’s Attorney General offered an assessment of the amendment prior to that
state’s election, and he concluded that insurance plans offered to domestic partners by private
employers would not be affected by the amendment; by implication, of course, public employers
could have been affected.270
All of the foregoing evidence notwithstanding, there is evidence that voters truly were
confused. Exit polling in Ohio after passage of the amendment, for instance, showed that 27
percent of voters supported full marriage rights for gays and lesbians, 35 percent supported civil
unions, and 27 percent opposed granting any legal rights to gays and lesbians.271 In other words,
fully 62 percent of the voters opposed the substance of the measure! The divergence between
voter action and voter intent is equally dramatic in Utah, where 77 percent of voters believed that
the amendment was only intended to define marriage.272 In fact, only 33 percent of those who
voted for the amendment believed that it would “[p]revent gay and [l]esbian couples from having
any basic benefits or rights, such as health insurance or hospital visitation.”273 Polling in Salt
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Lake County presents even more pronounced evidence of confusion: the amendment passed by
54 percent in Salt Lake County, but less than one year later, 57 percent of those same voters
supported “local governments in Utah providing basic health insurance benefits to long-term
committed partners of gay and lesbian employees.”274 If these voters had intended to prevent
domestic partners from receiving benefits from public entities, surely they would not have
changed their minds within the space of one year.
What conclusions can one draw here? It is clear that some portion of the electorate in the
Comparative Model MSA states understood the wide-ranging impact of the amendments and
appreciated the risk they posed to the domestic partners of gay and lesbian public employees.
Undoubtedly, some of the voters were unclear and indifferent; still others were likely unclear and
did not intend to create wide-ranging harm. Nevertheless, if one considers certain national
figures – for instance, the percentage of people nationally who support alternative marriage
forms, the number of localities around the country that currently offer domestic partner benefits,
the number of localities around the country that have implemented domestic partner registries,
and the number of states that forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment – combined with the evidence from individual states suggesting confusion in the
electorate, one can tentatively conclude that the voters did not intend to prohibit the extension of
partner benefits. The evidence of national trends, however, cannot be weighed in dispositive
fashion against the evidence presents itself in each individual state. Therefore, the answer to the
dilemma created by the ambiguous language used in the “similar to” amendments is deeply
uncertain: it truly depends on an assessment of the voters’ intent in each of the states.
b.

Application

This lack of clarity, then, extends to the question of whether the proposed hypothetical
policy that would cover John and Jason passes muster in one of the states imposing a “similar to”
criterion. If they live in a state like Michigan, where a wealth of evidence supports the claim that
the voters understood the risk to domestic partners who were employed by public entities, and at
least some evidence shows that they approved of this outcome, the plan might be invalid. On the
other hand, if they live in a state like Wisconsin where the evidence shows that the framers of the
amendment never intended to invalidate partner benefits offered by public entities, they might be
able to prevail on their claims.275 At the end of the day, a court in a “similar to” state that was
reviewing John and Jason’s claim should examine closely the evidence of voter intent before
finding that the policy should be either upheld or invalidated under the amendment.
Conclusion
As equality advocates develop strategies for ensuring that gay and lesbian employees
receive domestic partner benefits on the same basis as their heterosexual colleagues, they should
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take heart in knowing that some of the most far-reaching amendments may, in fact, be less
damaging than originally supposed. Fair interpretations of many of these amendments should
result in the conclusion that partner benefits regimes remain valid under state law. Of course,
new developments may obviate this concern. In response to the pressures that have been placed
on their partner benefits programs, some public entities have begun to restructure their policies in
such a way that gay and lesbian employees and their partners would still qualify for coverage,
but the policies themselves would no longer turn on the existence of a domestic partner
relationship. Michigan State University, for instance, has implemented a pilot program that
would offer benefits to a category of people that it describes as “other eligible individuals.”276 A
person would qualify for benefits if he or she had lived with a non-unionized employee for
eighteen months or more without being a tenant or dependent, and if the person was not
automatically eligible to inherit the employee’s property under Michigan law.277 Another option
that a public entity might employ is to establish a “household benefits” plan that would allow an
employee to designate one adult household member for coverage.278 In fact, two private
employers – Nationwide Insurance and Catholic Charities, a San Francisco-based non-profit
employer – have implemented household benefits plans.279 Plans like these, which base the
receipt of benefits on neutral criteria, might ultimately be the wave of the future. If, however,
these plans are not ideal because their fiscal impact is too great, or because some courts might
invalidate them as transparent attempts to evade the prohibition of an amendment, the foregoing
analysis might offer guidance to advocates who wish to protect the families of gays and lesbians
around the country.
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Appendix 1
Comparative Model Multi-Subject Amendments
Alabama

Arkansas

Idaho
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan

Nebraska

North Dakota

Ohio

South Carolina

South Dakota

Text
“A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same
sex in the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be
considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or
effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a
marriage or other union replicating marriage.”
“Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or
substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or
recognized in Arkansas, except that the legislature may recognize
a common law marriage from another state between a man and a
woman.”

Citation
Ala. Const.
amend. 774

“A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic
legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state.”
“A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage
for individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”
“A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”
“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society
and for future generations of children, the union of one man and
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as
a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”
“The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union,
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall
not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.”
“No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially
equivalent legal effect.”
“This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or
effect of marriage.”
“A marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful
domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State. This
State and its political subdivisions shall not create a legal status,
right or claim respecting any other domestic union, however
denominated. This State and its political subdivisions shall not
recognize or give effect to a legal status, right or claim created by
another jurisdiction respecting any other domestic union, however
denominated. Nothing in this section shall impair any right or
benefit extended by the State or its political subdivisions other
than a right or benefit arising from a domestic union that is not
valid or recognized in this State.”
“The uniting of two or more persons in a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other quasi-marital relationship shall not be valid
or recognized in South Dakota.”

Idaho Const. art.
III, § 28.
Ky. Const. part II,
§ 233A
La. Const. art.
XII, § 15.
Mich. Const. art.
I, § 25.
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Ark. Const.
amend. 83.

Neb. Const. art I,
§ 29.
N.D. Const. art.
XI, § 28.
Ohio Const. art.
XV, § 11.

S.C. Const. art.
XVII, § 15.

S.D. Const. art.
XXI, § 9.

Texas
Utah

Virginia

Wisconsin

“This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or
recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.”
“No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially
equivalent legal effect.”
“This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union,
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights,
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.”
“A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this
state.”

Tex. Const. art I. §
32.
Utah Const. art. I,
§ 29.
Va. Const. art. I, §
15.

Wis. Const. art.
XIII, § 13.

Appendix 2
Incidents Model Multi-Subject Amendments
Georgia
Kansas
Oklahoma

Virginia

Text
“No union between persons of the same sex shall be recognized by
this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage.”
“No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the
state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.”
“Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall be
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.”
“This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union,
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights,
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.”

Citation
Ga. Const. art. I, §
4.
Kan. Const. art.
XV, § 16.
Okla. Const. art.
II, § 35.
Va. Const. art. I, §
15.

Appendix 3
Single-Subject Amendments
Alaska
Colorado
Hawaii
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
Oregon

Text
“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman.”
“Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in this state.”
“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”
“Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this
state only between a man and a woman.”
“That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall
exist only between a man and a woman.”
“Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or recognized as a marriage in this state.”
“Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be
recognized and given effect in this state.”
“It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only
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Citation
Alaska Const. art.
I, § 25.
Colo. Const. art.
II, § 31.
Haw. Const. art. I,
§ 23.
Miss. Const. art.
XIV, § 263A
Mo. Const. art. I,
§ 33.
Mont. Const. art
XIII, § 7.
Nev. Const. art. I.
§ 21.
Or. Const. art.

Tennessee

a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
legally recognized as a marriage.”
“The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the
relationship of one man and one woman shall be the only legally
recognized marital contract in this state.”
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XV, § 5.
Tenn. Const. art
XI, § 18.

